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I. INTRODUCTION
It is perhaps a truism to say that an insurance policy is a contract,' but a
truism that glosses over many of the most problematic questions when ad-
judicating insurance coverage disputes. Within contract law itself, scholars
1. See, e.g. United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Riley, 899 A.2d 819, 833 (Md. 2006) (insurance poli-
cies are "treated as any other contract."); Vestin Mortg., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 139
P.3d 1055, 1057 (Utah 2006) (insurance policy is "merely a contract between the insured and
the insurer" to be "construed pursuant to the same rules applied to ordinary contracts"); Rory v.
Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W2d 23, 27 (Mich. 2005) (insurance policies governed by rules
governing all contracts). This view is also uniformly embraced in leading insurance and con-
tract treatises and casebooks, including my own. See, e.g., BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R.
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.01 (14th ed. 2008) (treating in-
surance policies as contracts, emphasizing intent of contracting parties over text of policy but
noting that courts typically treat policy language as best indicator of party intent); ROBERT H.
JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25A (4th ed. 2007)
(discussing insurance contract interpretation); LEO P. MARTINEZ & JOHN W. WHELAN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW (5th ed. 2006) (Ch. 2: "Forming and Negotiating the
Insurance Contract"; Ch. 3: "Interpretation of Insurance Contracts"); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS Chs. 3 passim (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009) (treating in-
surance as matter of contract); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS Ch. 2 (4th ed. 2005) (treating insurance policies as contracts); EUGENE R.
ANDERSON, JORDAN S. STANZLER & LORELIE S. MASTERS, INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION
Chs. 1 & 2 (2d ed. 2004) (same but noting Williston's observation that insurance policies have
elements of chattel as well as contract); EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W
STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW Ch. 2 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006) (extensive discus-
sion of contract interpretation groundrules and application to insurance); ROGER C. HEN-
DERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY II, INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS § 1.03 (3d ed. 2001)
(treating insurance as subspecies of contra in introductory chapter on the "nature of insurance
arrangements"); PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL, POLICYHOLDER'S
GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE (1997 & Supp. 2004) (same). But see STEMPEL
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra, § 3.01 at 3-5: ("For the most part, insurance contract law
is 'real' or 'regular' contract law applied to situations involving insurance--situations that
may to a greater degree than usual involve: standard form contracting, unequal bargaining
power, non-negotiated terms, ambiguity, and recurring equitable considerations that tend
to bring results less doctrinaire and consistent than those perhaps found in other areas of
law. Frequently, courts or legislatures have attempted to organize or explain these results by
enunciating contract axioms that purport to be peculiar to insurance disputes. ... Those pro-
nouncements and case outcomes, however, are not so different from what one would expect
from 'ordinary' contract litigation.")
With the wisdom of hindsight, I now see this view, albeit one acknowledging the limits of
a narrow contractual approach to insurance coverage disputes, as one that remains perhaps
excessively moored to the traditional view of insurance policies as mere contracts and insuf-
ficiently appreciative of the manner in which insurance policies also resemble products or
statutes, and are part of a social and economic fabric of effective risk management. Other
observers were quicker to pick up on this facet of insurance. See, e.g., HENDERSON & JERRY,
supra, at 18 (perhaps the most significant characteristic of insurance contracts that differenti-
ates them from ordinary, negotiated commercial contracts is the increasing tendency of the
public to look upon an insurance policy not as a personal contract between the insurer and
insured but as a special form of chattel") (citing 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900 at 34 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963) ("The typical [insurance] applicant buys
'protection' as much as he buys groceries.... [F]or most purposes, insurance must still be
considered a contract between insurer and insured, but it is a very special type of contract
and one currently involved in a prolonged period of popular gestation form which it may
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and courts differ over the respective primacy of text, party intent, contrac-
tual purpose, extrinsic evidence, and public policy in determining inter-
pretative outcomes. Even where interpreters focus on a single dimension
of the meaning of contract (e.g., the text of the contract documents), they
often disagree as to the meaning of the text in question as well as over the
general approach to construing text (e.g., broad vs. narrow, plain meaning
vs. ordinary meaning, etc.).
In a world where most contracts are based on standardized forms, con-
tracts have begun to look more like off-the-rack products or services rather
than the individually negotiated deals that spawned the law of contract, a
fact emphasized forty years ago by noted contracts scholars.2 But despite
the longstanding realization of the goods-like character of contracts in the
academy, contract construction law has largely failed to make effective use
of this observation to improve judicial resolution of disputes over con-
tract meaning. This is especially true, and regrettable, regarding insurance
policies, in which standardization is particularly dominant and where the
transaction evinces a sale of a certain scope of risk shifting and distribu-
tion rather than entry into any particular or ongoing business relationship.
Relentlessly, and often simplistically, courts continue to intone that they
are merely reading insurance policies as written and contending that even
highly problematic language is crystal clear3 or that difficulty in translating
well eventually emerge as a new and special form of chattel, or perhaps, quasi-chattel.").
Despite the truth and venerability of Williston's observation, one scholar recently suggested
that modern "[i]insurance case law is increasingly marked by judicial reliance on the principle
of freedom of contract." See Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS.
LJ. 107, 107 (2007).
2. See, e.g., W David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control Over Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. Rev. 529 (1971); Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L.
Rov. 131 (1970). See text and accompanying notes 15-24, infra, discussing implications of
Slawson and Leff observations. See also note 1, supra (product-like characteristics of insurance
policies noted by contracts scholar Samuel Williston).
3. See, e.g., Nehra v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 559 N.W2d 48 (Mich. 1997)
(finding term "accident" to clearly preclude coverage for injury occurring over time); E. Assoc.
Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law) (finding policy unambiguous, cautioning that courts should not "torture" policy
language in effort to find ambiguity doctrine and invoke contra proferentem principle); Deni
Assoc. of Fla. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998) (language of
absolute pollution exclusion unambiguously clear as applied to claim stemming from broken
blueprint machine leaking fumes forcing evacuation of office building); E.C. Fogg v. Fla.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998) (same as applied to accidental spray-
ing of field inspector by crop duster); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 931 P.2d
127 (Utah 1997) (qualified pollution exclusion language unambiguous as applied to gradual
pollution at manufacturing plant despite exception to exclusion for release that was "sudden
and accidental"). See also KALIs, REITER & SEGERDAHL, supra note 1, § 10.04 at 10-3810.38.1(chart notes near 50-50 split in states as to the meaning of language of qualified pollution
exclusion contained in standard commercial general liability (CGL) policies, with courts ap-
plying exclusion concluding its language unambiguous despite disagreement of nearly half
the states).
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the words of a policy immediately triggers the ambiguity principle requir-
ing resolution of controversies against the insurer.
4
This article attempts to move toward sounder construction and applica-
tion of insurance policies, with resulting improvements in the resolution
and consistency of disputes over insurance coverage by expressly applying
the notion that insurance policies are products or "things" purchased by
policyholders in order to obtain particular benefits and sold by insurers as
goods conveying particular value to the policyholder. Fully appreciating
this trait of the insurance policy and the insurance relationship can assist
courts in better determining the contours of coverage in all cases, particu-
larly difficult cases, especially those in which the policy text at issue admits
of multiple reasonable readings or appears to lead to a problematic result
if read literally.
II. PRODUCT-LIKE CHARACTERISTICS
OF STANDARD CONTRACTS AND
INSURANCE POLICIES
There are several mainstream perspectives regarding the "right" way of
viewing contracts and discerning their meaning as applied to various dis-
putes. Competing for primacy in construing contracts (and listed in rough
presumptive order of hegemony) are the following. First is the text of the
contract documents,' an indicator of contract meaning that is alternately
4. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (apply-
ing Indiana law) ("the only factual predicate of the rule that insurance contracts should be
construed against the insurer is the requirement that the contract be ambiguous." Contra
proferentem principle activated upon finding of facial ambiguity; no resort to other interpre-
tative tools); Bowler v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 250 A.2d 580 (NJ. 1969) (court makes decision based
on ambiguity principle after finding text facially unclear; no resort to extrinsic evidence or
assessment based on nontextual factors.
5. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS Ch. 7 (4th ed. 2004). Contract interpretation is
considered a question of law rather than a question of fact, which, as a practical matter, means
that courts decide the meaning of contracts and contract text, even if certain factual disputes
bearing on contract meaning must be resolved by a jury. Further, a trial court's construction of
a contract and assigned meaning, being a question of law, is reviewed de novo on appeal, with
no deference to the trial court's contract analysis (although as a practical matter, appellate
courts will, of necessity, grant some weight to the trial judge's close position for observation
and will of course defer to fact findings bearing on the question of contract meaning).
In determining textual meaning, courts often use, sometimes implicitly, canons of con-
struction or presumptions about language. For example, words are generally to be given their
"ordinary" meaning rather than any specialized meaning, unless the facts and circumstances
suggest that a specialized meaning was intended. See FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra
note 1, § 2.10. In addition, the entire policy or contract (and not only the term in dispute) is
to be examined, with more weight accorded to customized language or endorsements than
is accorded to the standard form boilerplate of the insurance policy. Id. The structure and
organization of the policy may also have a bearing on the weight and interpretation accorded
to policy text. Id. § 2.11.
HeinOnline -- 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 816 2008-2009
The Insurance Policy as Thing 817
enshrined in the "plain meaning" and "ordinary meaning" approaches 6 and
indirectly regulated through the contra proferentem principle of construing
unclear contract language against the drafter.' Application of ambiguity
analysis to unclear text can vary accordingly among courts.' In addition,
courts to varying degrees consider the intent of the contracting parties;9
the purpose of the agreement;10 the understanding and expectations of the
6. For purposes of this article, I use the term "plain meaning" to refer to judicial decisions
that read the face of contract text literally without regard to the connotative value a term may
have in a given context or with a particular audience. Courts typically use the term "ordinary
meaning" as a synonym for plain meaning. See Alani Golanski, Linguistics in Law, 66 ALB. L.
REv. 61, 63 (2002); Ellen Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,
30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275, 280 (1998). This article will follow the same convention. Accord, ANDER-
SON, STANZLER & MAsTERS, supra note 1, § 2.01 [A] at 2-9 (in construing insurance policies,
"[tihe court will first attempt to construe an insurance policy term according to its plain and
ordinary meaning. In the insurance context, the plain and ordinary meaning usually is that of
the reasonable ordinary layperson.) (italics in original). See also ANDERSON, STANZLER & MAS-
TERS § 2.03 (suggesting that by "plain and ordinary meaning," treatise authors have in mind
what many term "ordinary meaning" as opposed to "plain" and literal dictionary definition
of policy term) (also suggesting that older cases and treatises take a more objectively literalist
view of text along lines of what is termed "plain" meaning in this article); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 5, § 7.12 at 463 (discussing "plain meaning rule" that limits use of parol evidence if the
language of the contract documents, "when taken in context, is so clear that evidence of prior
negotiations cannot be used in its interpretation.").
However, three linguistic experts have argued that the two terms differ in that properly
understood, ordinary meaning suggests construing the a document's meaning not solely from
its text but also its context and with greater solicitude for the term's understanding among
laypersons as opposed to its technically correct or dictionary meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence M.
Solan, The New Textualists'New Text, 38 Loy. L.A.L. Rmv. 2027, 2038 (2005); Peter W Schroth,
Law and Language, 46 AM. J. COMp. LAw 17, 26 (1998); Eileen Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practi-
cal Reason, and the Law of Evidence, 44 A. U. L. REV. 1717, 1745 (1995).
7. The contra proferentem principle (from Latin for "against the drafter") posits that if
contract language is ambiguous, the language shall be construed against the drafter of the
instrument. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.8; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 1, § 4.08; Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MicH. L.
REv. 531 (1996) (finding ambiguity principle to be touchstone for insurance policy construc-
tion); E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YAE LEJ. 939 (1967) (ad-
dressing types and nature of contractual ambiguity and its consequences). As discussed in
text and accompanying notes 74-78 below, the text in question, in both insurance and non-
insurance contexts, is really part of a contract document memorializing the contract. The
contract itself is the actual agreement between the parties. However, common usage routinely
speaks of the language of a contract rather than the language of a contract document, a con-
venient but potentially misleading style of discourse that this article, like almost all others,
will use for ease of reference.
8. See FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 2.05 (noting variance of courts and
commentators regarding proper role of ambiguity analysis, dividing jurisdictions roughly into
strong ambiguity courts quick to invoke contra proferentem, weak ambiguity courts resistant
to use of the doctrine, and moderate courts). Compare Abraham, supra note 7, with Michael B.
Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Con-
struedAgainst the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171 (1995); David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Con-
tract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1849 (1988).
9. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 7.7; 7.10.
10. Id. §§ 7.10; 7.11.
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parties (a factor most obviously enshrined in the reasonable expectations
approach which, at least in moderate form, is a mainstream contract inter-
pretation doctrine);" and social and judicial values that, on occasion, per-
mit judicial policing of even unambiguous agreements in order to prevent
contracts from becoming oppressive or otherwise undermining sociolegal
norms. Use of unconscionability analysis is an example of this type of con-
tract interpretation, as is the striking down or modifying of a contract on
grounds of illegality or violation of public policy. 2
In addition to these mainstream views of contract and insurance policy
construction, 3 there has long been percolating, but not fully articulated,
the notion that an insurance policy, despite being a contract, is also some-
thing other than a contract. Based on its history of industrywide formula-
tion to meet a perceived market need, its standardization, and the manner
in which it is marketed and sold, the insurance policy, in many ways, is
more a product or good than it is a contract. Courts have occasionally
hinted at this characterization of an insurance policy, most often when de-
ciding cases on reasonable expectations or purpose grounds, 14 but have not
fully developed the insurance-policy-as-product in sight into a full-fledged
jurisprudential approach.'5 In the aftermath of Robert Keeton's reasonable
11. Judicial use of party intent, overall purpose of the contract, or party expectations will
vary according to the courts' attitudes toward extrinsic evidence in relation to policy test. See
FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 2.07. It appears, however, that most courts will
consider contractual course of performance, the parties' course of dealing, and trade usage in
construing insurance policy terms, even if the text of the policy standing alone is reasonably
clear. See FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 1, at 109-10.
12. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 4.10.
13. Regarding the hierarchy and coordination of these mainstream contract construction
factors, see FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 2.06.
14. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
Prior to Keeton's article and scholarly recognition of the reasonable expectations doctrine,
courts had on occasion found the product/warranty analogy helpful in resolving insurance
disputes. See, e.g., State Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Kintner, 185 N.E.2d 527, 531-33 (Ind. 1962)
(Arterburn, C.J., concurring); Glickman v. N.Y Life Ins. Co., 107 P.2d 252 (Cal. 1940).
15. The prospect of C & J Fertilizer opening the door to sustained judicial examination
of whether an insurance policy was fit for its intended purpose received a setback when the
Iowa Supreme Court curtailed the use and breadth of the reasonable expectations approach
to contract construction in Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W2d 104
(Iowa 1981). This was part of the general "counter-revolution" of sorts against the Kee-
tonesque strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine discussed in STEMPEL ON INSUR-
ANCE CoT-RAcrs, supra note 1, § 4.09[D] [4]. See also Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations
Reconsidered, 18 CoN. L. REv. 323 (1986).
The tide against a strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine, one that would even
trump clear but problematic policy language, tended to also pull back the possible use of a
breach-of-warranty or product-defect approach to construction. Nearly thirty-five years after
it was rendered, C &I Fertilizer remains the insurance coverage case that most directly ad-
dresses the insurance policy as a product and the insurer's promise as akin to a manufacturer's
warranty, although there have been cases alluding to this aspect of C &J. Fertilizer See, e.g.,
Carper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1985); Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Batton v. Tenn. Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co., 736 P.2d 2, 8 (Ariz. 1987).
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expectations articles and cases adopting the doctrine, 6 insurance scholars
noted the product-like aspects of insurance policies, but did not develop
the concept of insurance policies as products at length. 7
By contrast, non-insurance contract scholars in the late 20th Century
have done quite a bit of writing about the degree to which modem, mass
standardized contracting arguably creates "contract-products" and thus
calls into question the efficacy of traditional, bargain-based theories of
contract law in deciding cases. A well-known salvo in this scholarly discus-
sion was Professor W David Slawson's article Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power,'" which brought the issue to the
fore in a way that the contract of adhesion articles of the 1940s had not.
With the statement that "standard form contracts probably account for
more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made,"' 9 Slawson
caught the attention of the scholarly and judicial world, which thereafter
paid increased attention to the impact of standardized contracts of adhe-
sion.20 At the same time, there appeared to be an upsurge in concern for
16. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
RiEv. 961 (1970); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions:
Part II, 83 HAiv. L. Rav. 1281 (1970). In the wake of Keeton's seminal articles, much was
written about the reasonable expectations approach to insurance policy construction. See,
e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. RE. 1151 (1981); Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations After Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998). See generally STEMPEL
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 4.09.
17. See, e.g., WILLIAM E YOUNG & ERIC M. HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
INSURANCE 83-91 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing judicial construction and regulation of insurance
policies with an "Implied Warranty of Fitness" approach, excerpting C&J Fertilizer and Farm
Bureau v. Sandbulte, with only two pages of notes and commentary regarding the concept);
Rahdert, supra note 15, at 710-25; John N. Ellison & Timothy P. Law, Bad Faith and Punitive
Damages the Policyholder's Guide to Bad Faith Insurance Coverage Litigation-Understanding the
Available Recovery Tools, SK095 ALI-ABA 251 (2005); Eugene R. Anderson, Randy Paar &
Sarah Hectman, The Submission of a Claim Under Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Will
Lead to an Adversarial Response by the Insurance Company, as Evidenced by Disputes over Alloca-
tion and Advancement, 692 PLI/Comm 191 (1994); William Mark Lashner, A Common Law
Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts,
57 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1175 (1982); Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thurmann, A New and Old
Theory forAdjudicating Standardized Contracts, 17 GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 323 (1987); Peter D.
Rosenthal, Have Bank Regulators Been Missing the Forest for the Public Policy Tree? The Case for
Contract-Based Arguments in the Litigation of Regulatory Exclusions in Director and Officer Liabil-
ity Policies, 75 B.U.L. REv. 155 (1995); Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to
the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000);Joseph E.
Minnock, Comment, Protecting the Insured from an Adhesion Insurance Policy: The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Utah, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 837.
18. See Slawson, supra note 2, at 529.
19. See id. (emphasis removed).
20. See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REv.
139 (2005); Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1 (2002); Carl B. Swanson, Unconscio-
nable Quandry: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M.L. REv. 359 (2001);
John Dwight Ingram, The Insured's Expectations Should be Honored Only If They Are Reasonable,
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contract fairness and judicial use of policing tools such as illegality, public
policy, and the unconscionability doctrine.2
During this same period, Professor Arthur Leff, who had attacked the
unconscionability concept as too much freewheeling judicial license to
alter contract meaning,22 extended the concept that standardization had
23 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 813 (1997); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law:
The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI. L. REv. 1263 (1993); Holmes &
Thurmann, supra note 17; John E. Murray, Jr., Symposium, The Standardized Agreement Phe-
nomenon in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735 (1982); Edward A.
Dauer, Contracts ofAdhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis:An Introduction, 5 AxEON L. REv. 1
(1972). Professor Slawson was also part of his own intellectual wake, continuing to write im-
portant articles on the topic. See W David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to
Prevent Deceptive Contracting by Standard Form, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 853 (2006); Slawson,
The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts by Law by Standard Forms, 46 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 21(1984); Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. R~v. 1
(1974). See also SLwsoN, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTuRY REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT LAW (1996).
21. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 4.28, 5.1 (citing several important cases applying
these doctrines from 1955 to 1965. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
E2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
22. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L Rav. 485, 487 (1967). Leff's critique of both the unconscionability section of the re-
vised Uniform Commercial Code (§ 302) and unconscionability generally spurred a torrent of
debate. Compare, M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969) (vig-
orously defending unconscionability concept and attacking Leff's analysis); John E. Murray,
Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1969) (same); Richard E. Speidel,
Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. Pirr. L. REv. 359, 374-75 (1970) (sup-
porting unconscionability); Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITr.
L. REv. 33, 338 (1970) (modestly supporting unconscionability, but agreeing with much of
Leff's critique); with Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
EcON. 293, 294-95 (1975) (criticizing unconscionability on ground it excessively undermines
freedom of contract ideal); Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible
Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485-90 (1974) (less critical of unconscionability, but finding
such ad hoc judicial regulation misguided, advocating legislative or administrative solution
for problem of unfair contract terms); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PiTr. L. REv. 349 (1970) (policing of contract
terms, even if justified for consumers, should be done by elected branches, not courts).
Although one can debate whether defenders or opponents of unconscionability had bet-
ter arguments, there is no doubt that Leff and those critical of unconscionability had more
influence among courts and counsel, perhaps because its resistance to judicial regulation of
contract terms struck a responsive court with businesses and courts seeking to set reasonable
limits on the judicial role. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilib-
rium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 757, 814-21 (2004) (noting that Left's article and its critique was
cited much more frequently than articles responding to Leff or defending unconscionability
analysis).
In addition, the rise of the Law and Economics scholarship, which took a similarly criti-
cal view of judicial policing of contract terms, added wind to Left's sails. Stempel, supra, at
818-25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (1973) (publication of
leading treatise, now in its Sixth Edition, designed for general legal audience of students,
practitioners and judges marks the "arrival" of law and economics as a mainstream form of
self-conscious legal analysis); Epstein, supra; Goldberg, supra. Ironically, although Left had
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changed the nature of contract and labeled standardized contracts as
"things" rather than traditional contracts.23 Leff did not regard standard-
ization as bad or view standardized terms as inherently oppressive. He did,
however, see most modem contracts as mass produced items more than
negotiated agreements. Consequently, he advocated treating the standard-
ized agreement more like a product for purposes of government regulation,
including judicial interpretation and policing of contract terms. However,
he urged only limited government interference with standard form con-
tract terms.
24
Subsequent scholars developed the Slawson and Leff insights at greater
length and applied them to specific types of contracts, in particular not-
ing the analog of product liability law,25 with insurance scholarship follow-
reservations about judicial use of the unconscionability concept and was certainly not antago-
nistic toward economic analysis, neither was he a true disciple. See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. RE. 451 (1974) (reviewing Posner's
Economic Analysis of Law).
But an intellectual trend seldom succeeds in accomplishing a paradigm shift in which the
new way of thinking completely displaces the old, thereby forcing a revision of basic texts and
teaching. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENrIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (de-
scribing characteristics of true paradigm shift in science) (as distinguished from the overuse
of the word "paradigm" in modem political, legal, and social discourse). Unconscionability is
still a significant part of contracts treatises and casebooks, is still taught in law school classes,
and (most important perhaps) is still used with some frequency by the courts, albeit often in
tandem with judicial invocation of public policy concerns, perhaps suggesting that unconscio-
nability alone often lacks the requisite punch to defeat freedom of contract and plain textual
meaning arguments. See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005)
(ski resort's broad waiver of liability clause unconscionable and against public policy); Dono-
van v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702 (Cal. 2001) (applying unconscionability analysis to save auto-
mobile dealer from financial consequences of misprint in advertisement stating low sale price
for expensive vehicle); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable); Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d
1277 (Ariz. 1999) (finding noncompete clause in medical doctor's contract with professional
corporation so broad as to be unconscionable and in violation of public policy).
23. Arthur Alan Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 131 (1970).
24. Id. at 135-40. Leff's argument was that even standardized contract terms contained in
contracts of adhesion were sufficiently subject to market forces that problematic terms would
eventually be revised to become adequately fair and efficient. Subsequent law and economics
scholarship has defended this view. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An
Economic Theory of How Standard-form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Busi-
nesses and Consumers, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 857 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner,
One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REv. 827 (2006); Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wdde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples
of Warranties and Security Interest, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983); George L. Priest, A General
Theoy of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. EcON. 615
(1981).
25. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclo-
sure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REv. 565, 624 (2006); Robert A. Hillman & Jef-
frey J. Rachlinski, Standard-form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U.L. REv. 429, 444
(2002); Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 657, 681 (1985);
HeinOnline -- 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 821 2008-2009
822 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Spring/Summer 2009 (44:3-4)
ing to some degree.26 Ironically, insurance scholarship was once ahead of
this metaphorical curve of contract analysis. Professor Edwin Patterson
touched upon the issue in Essentials of Insurance Law27 and in an article dis-
cussing the insurance policy as a contract of adhesion.28 For the most part,
however, modern insurance law scholarship has not focused at any length
on the product-like qualities of insurance policies and the implications for
insurance coverage disputes.
A. Professor Schwarcz ' Product Liability Approach
to Insurance Policies
In A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies,
Professor Daniel Schwarcz made a substantial contribution toward filling
this void and a persuasive case for the view that it is instructive for courts
to view insurance policies as products as well as contracts, and to apply
defective product analysis to determine whether the court should mandate
coverage even in the face of contrary policy language. 29 Schwarcz argues
that courts should police ("regulate" in his terminology) insurance policy
content, not by reference to the reasonable expectations of consumers, but
according to a product-liability theory that considers whether an insurance
policy is defectively designed and whether the insurer has failed to warn
the policyholder of limitations on coverage.3"
One could read Schwarcz's article as finding it permissible for courts to
mandate coverage in cases where it can be said that the insurance policy
in question is not adequate for the purpose for which it was sold, although
Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 5, 18-19 (1984).
See also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HAI-v. L. Rav. 1173
(1983).
26. See, e.g., Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policy-
holders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CoNN. INS. L.J. 335, 422-23
(1998-99) (previously "insurance policies were treated as contracts. Today, more and more
they are treated like products"); James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is
Indispensable, if We Only Knew What for?, 5 CoNN. INS. LJ. 151, 158 (1998-99) (making anal-
ogy of insurance policies and consumer products).
27. See EDWIN PATrERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (1955).
28. See, e.g., Edwin W Patterson, The Delivey of a Life-Insurance Poliey, 33 HARv. L. REv.
198 (1919). See also Comment, The Application to Insurance Contracts of the Implied Warranty in
Sales Law, 35 YALE L.J. 203 (1925). Subsequently, non-insurance contracts scholarship came
to focus on contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Nathan Isaacs, The Standardization of Contracts, 27
YALE LJ. 34 (1917); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704 (1931); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 628 (1943); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1953); Edwin W Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction
of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833 (1964); Nicholas S. Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhe-
sion Contracts, 14 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 172 (1965).
29. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance
Policies, 48 WM. & MAtY L. Rrv. 1389 (2007).
30. Id. at 1395-1401, 1439-56.
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this may be a stronger statement than the nuances of the article justify.31
Professor Schwarcz suggests that cases of market failure and inefficient
terms present the greatest case for judicial regulation, perhaps the only
case justifying a departure from clear policy language. He suggests that
courts take this more aggressive approach to insurance policy construction
and mandate coverage primarily in cases where it can be said that the insur-
ance policy is inefficient in design and where the insurer has insufficient
market discipline to constrain self-serving or opportunistic behavior in the
course of drafting, marketing, and issuing policies.3"
Under this approach to insurance policy adjudication, the product liabil-
ity approach to be applied is not the consumer expectations test that for-
merly enjoyed substantial support in tort law, but the modern risk-utility
test.
Following products liability law, courts could improve the drafting incentives
of insurers by imposing insurance coverage, despite clear policy language to
the contrary, when the coverage dispute involves (a) a provision that is par-
ticularly likely to be the result of inefficient drafting by insurers due to market
failure ("insurance harms"), and (b) policy language that fails a cost-benefit,
reasonable-alternative-design test that assesses whether the insurer acted in-
efficiently in choosing to draft or adopt policy language ("insurance design
defects"). When there is both an insurance harm and an insurance design
defect, (c) insurers could be required to pay coverage that causes them to
internalize the costs of their failure to act efficiently ("damages")."
[A]n "insurance harm" [is defined as] the denial of insurance coverage when
any ambiguity exists, from an ex post perspective, about whether the under-
writing purposes of the applicable policy exclusion warrant not covering the
loss at issue. Under this test, a court would ask whether the insurer has any
legitimate underwriting purpose for not insuring against the specific loss that
befell the insured.
34
31. Id. at 1397-1401, 1435-62.
32. Id. at 1397-1401, 1445-52.
33. Id. at 1445-46 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id. at 1447-48. Schwarcz notes basic underwriting purposes reflected in the insurance
literature stating that a loss subject to sound underwriting must be "(1) measurable, (2) ob-
servable," (3) uncorrelated or only weakly correlated, with "(4) low risk of moral hazard,"
"(5) low risk of adverse selection," and (6) anticipated (although he finds this inapplicable in
light of the ex post analysis he proposes). Id. at 1448 (footnotes omitted). In addition, he cites
"juridical hazard" as an underwriting concern. Juridical hazard is the risk of incurring high,
unpredictable, or unmanageable transaction costs in connection with a claim. It refers to "the
transaction costs to insurers of deciding whether to pay a claim, which include the costs of fact
gathering and legal fees." Id. This risk may prompt insurers to use bright-line terms in poli-
cies "that imperfectly facilitate legitimate underwriting purposes while minimizing juridical
hazard, because they are easy to apply:" after a loss. Id.
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Insurance law could follow products liability law and jettison its consumer ex-
pectations approach in favor of a defective design test that evaluates whether
an insurance harm was the result of inefficient insurer behavior, by applying
a marginal cost-benefit test premised on reasonable alternative designs....
[If] a plaintiff can show that (1) the insurance harm was foreseeable ex ante,
and (2) could have been avoided by reasonable alternative language, the inef-
ficiency of the insurer's drafting will be clear.3"
Following the lead of products liability law, the two types of insurance claims
described above should be mutually exclusive from one another, so that in-
sureds can assert defective design claims against insurers regardless of the
adequacy of the warnings that the insurer provides, and vice versa.
36
Regarding failure to warn, Schwarcz proposes following, for insurance,
a regime similar to that of tort law, in which
firms are strictly liable for providing an "inadequate" warning or instruction
to consumers "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
As an example of a case presenting an insurance harm to a policyholder and justifying judi-
cial regulation of the policy term, Schwarcz cites Coblentz v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co., 915 P.2d 938, 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995), overruled by Bratcher v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 961 P.2d 828, 831 (Okla. 1998). Schwarz, supra note 29, at 1448-49,
1455. In Coblentz, the policyholder's home was destroyed. The insurer sought to apply the
"holdback" provisions of the policy's replacement cost terms, which mandated that the policy-
holder actually rebuild a damaged home in order to enjoy full replacement cost benefits. The
purpose of such a clause is to lower the risk that a policyholder may find it advantageous to
arrange destruction of property in order to obtain insurance proceeds for a planned reloca-
tion. To get all the insurance money, the policyholder has to go through rebuilding. But
policyholder Coblentz was caught in a Catch-22 situation in which he did not have enough
savings to procure a contractor and he could not rebuild without first getting full payment
from the insurer.
As Schwarcz observes, Coblentz presents a strong case for refusing to enforce the policy's
holdback provision. "From an ex post perspective, it is relatively clear that the applicable
clause's underwriting purpose did not apply: Coblentz's home was destroyed by a tornado,
which is impossible to fake.... the very nature of Coblentz's loss made clear that the under-
writing purpose did not apply. Id. at 1449 (footnotes omitted). In addition, "the overbreadth
of the policy's replacement clause relative to its underwriting purpose was fairly obvious, and
it could have been reasonably resolved ex ante through myriad drafting techniques" such as
providing "that insurance money in excess of the market value of the home will be paid di-
rectly to contractors or builders who are replacing the home." Id. at 1455, n.287.
In addition, Schwarcz uses this as an example of the advantages a product liability model
of insurance can have over a reasonable expectations model in that, under "the dominant in-
terpretation of the reasonable expectations doctrine... an insurer [can] exclude coverage for
any loss so long as the exclusion is adequately communicated to the insured." Id. at 1460.
35. See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1454-55 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 1459 (noting that "Products liability adheres to this rule because of the inherent
limitations of warnings [and that] a defectively designed product cannot be made safe with a
good warning." (footnotes omitted)). The parallel to insurance is clear language in exclusions,
endorsements, sales materials, or agent statements that may be ineffective for communicat-
ing the limitations of a policy to an applicant or policyholder about a defective policy design,
structure, or wording. Relatedly, even a substantial warning may be insufficient to make en-
forceable a policy with severe limitations on coverage.
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have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings." [But because] [m]ultiple warnings tend to crowd one another out,
leaving consumers with a diluted set of information that most will either ig-
nore or fail to appreciate .... 7
Insurance law could mimic products liability law and impose insurance cov-
erage for risks that insurers do not "adequately disclose" to insureds. Either
on the declarations page, or in another appropriately highlighted document,
insurers could cheaply and effectively inform consumers about a limited num-
ber of coverage exclusions and their potential implications. If written in bold,
large print, and place below a heading with large, capitalized letters reading,
"WARNING," many, if not most, consumers would read an appropriately
limited disclosure. 38
Although the details of a disclosure regime would need to be worked out over
time, several basic suggestions can be made. First, insurers could be required to
disclose the basic ways in which their policies substantially deviate from any ex-
isting industry norms.... Second, and more generally, insurance law could re-
quire a basic disclosure to consumers that they are less likely to receive coverage
if they act in a manner that clearly and obviously increases their risk of lOSS. 39
A third potential insurance warning might seek to mitigate consumers' cogni-
tive biases when it comes to assessing insurance policy coverage. Rather than
assuming the persistence of consumers' bounded ability to assess the limita-
tions of insurance, this approach would attempt to help consumers overcome
this limitation through the use of insurance warnings. 40
[A] fourth warning strategy could inform consumers about specific limita-
tions in their insurance coverage that could be addressed by purchasing state-
underwritten supplemental coverage.... For instance, private insurance compa-
nies sell federally underwritten flood insurance. Similarly, the California Earth-
quake Authority relies on participating insurers to sell its policies. However,
private insurers are likely to have inadequate incentives to market these policies
to their customers: "[in spite of financial incentives currently in place because in
such cases insurers] do not earn any investment income from insured's premium
dollars, a primary source of income for ordinary insurance policies." 41
As a prelude to his proposal of a product liability model for regulating
insurance policies, Schwarcz makes a compelling case for viewing insur-
37. Id. at 1440 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
§ 2(c)).
38. Id. at 1441.
39. Id. at 1441-42 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 1443 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 1444-45 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Daniel Schwarcz, Keep On Giving to Katrina
Relief DENVER POST, Sept. 17, 2005, at E-05). See also Adam E Scales, A Nation of Policyholders:
Governmental and Market Failure in FloodInsurance, 26 Miss. C.L. Rv. 3 (2006-07) (proposing
that, as a condition of licensing, homeowners' insurers be required to include flood coverage
in standard home insurance policies).
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ance policies as products as well as contracts and also describes the man-
ner in which traits of the insurance market may result in policy terms less
favorable to consumers than those of other mass contracts.
For one, consumer policyholders appear systematically uninformed
about standard policy terms, which presents insurers with an opportunity
to exploit consumer ignorance for greater gain unless there is counter-
vailing judicial regulation or some other type of government regulation.4
Contributing to this is the massive use of standard forms for insurance,
which "as a practical matter, must be used by all but the largest market
participants. '43 The type of market competition that might otherwise pro-
duce efficient and fair terms even in mass standardized contracts is thus
unlikely to occur.44 Insurance policy drafting is largely a collective enter-
prise, particularly in the property and casualty markets in which standard
forms authored by the Insurance Services Organization (ISO) dominate
the market.
45
[I]nformed and rational consumers faced with inefficient coverage provisions
may not have the option of going to a competing insurer to find different and
better coverage.... [IThe only way these consumers can "punish" insurers for
using inefficient terms is to drop out of the market for insurance altogether.
This result stands in stark contrast to a competitive drafting market .... 46
"[The problem is particularly severe for consumers and small businesses,
which,] unlike large corporations,.. . do not have the capacity to substitute
from traditional insurance to alternative risk transfer devices, such as catas-
trophe bonds or self-insurance. '47 These broadly drafted policy forms are
so open-ended as to invite difficulty in the future when events take place
that were not specifically considered or discussed by the parties, but argu-
ably fall within the scope of the broad policy form language.
4 1
Because responsive consumers are by assumption knowledgeable about
policy terms, they will choose endorsements that eliminate inefficiently
one-sided exclusions. By offering exploitive coverage in the standard base
policy, but then providing efficient coverage in alternative base policies or
endorsements, insurers can conceivably discriminate between responsive
and unresponsive consumers.
49
42. See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1402-03, 1407-09.
43. Id. at 1404.
44. Id. at 1405-06.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1406.
47. Id. at 1407.
48. Id. at 1404, 1410-12.
49. Id. at 1408. As an example, Schwarcz cites Atwood v. Harford Accident & Indemnity
Co., 365 A.2d 744 (N.H. 1976), in which a court refused to enforce against a self-employed
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In addition, the costs to insurers of changing policy forms is substantial,
a fact that prompts insurers to continue using forms they know are prob-
lematic"° and perhaps even "perniciously" ambiguous."' In addition, the
use of standard form endorsements as a means of varying insurance policy
content, while perhaps adequate for providing some measure of bargain-
ing choice to sophisticated policyholders, makes it more difficult for less
informed consumers to resist being misled by standardization of a complex
product that they do not understand. 2 Also, widespread price regulation
likely prompts insurers to attempt to gain surplus through the use of un-
reasonably favorable policy terms rather than through price competition of
the sort that would take place in a more typical market.5 3
Market discipline is unlikely to cure these problems, particularly for in-
surance sold to consumers and small or less sophisticated businesses be-
cause of the "bounded rationality" of the policyholders. A considerable
body of theoretical and empirical work suggests that market participants,
and consumers in particular, are not fully rational, but only boundedly ra-
tional, in that they are capable of correctly evaluating only a limited num-
ber of variables in assessing the value of a product or service.5 4 This makes
these policyholders poor de facto regulators of oppressive contract terms
through market participation. For example, it appears that consumers place
undue stock in insurer reputation created by advertising, while simultane-
electrician policyholder the policy's exclusion for completed operations liability in a case aris-
ing out of a child's death from heat exposure due to faulty installation of a thermostat. An
endorsement providing coverage for such completed operations was readily available at com-
paratively low cost for "knowledgeable consumers" and is purchased by "[m]any informed
insureds." Id. at 1408-09. For discussion of the distinctions between premises/operations li-
ability and products/completed operations liability in the context of general liability insur-
ance, see STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 14.07.
50. See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1404, 1412-13. Accord, Michelle E. Boardman, Contra
Proferentem: The Allure ofAmbiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. Riv. 1105 (2006). See also Mar-
cel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or
"The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997).
51. See Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CH.-KENT. L.
REv. 859 (2004).
52. See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1404, 1407-09.
53. Id. at 1404, 1409-10.
54. Id. at 1420-22. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1217-18 (2003); Robert A. Hilliman, The Limits
of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L.
RE. 717, 721 (2000); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection"
Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 8-9(1999); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 211, 240-44 (1995); David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload:
An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 300 (1986) (psychological studies
suggest that consumers normally cannot utilize more than five salient product features in
evaluating product).
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ously not investing significant resources in evaluating the design, language,
and operation of an insurance policy."
Among the problems created by the cognitive errors of policyholders is
a tendency to ignore improbable risk and thus, not examine and consider
policy terms related to such risks.5 6 Conversely, policyholders may over-
value certain risks (and overpay for protection against such risks) because
of a mistaken view that these risks are more likely than is actually the case.
This type of "availability" heuristic error often occurs when a type of risk
or loss received unusual media attention disproportionate to the actual
danger it presents. For example, during Fall 2001, most people mistakenly
thought that the risk of injury from terrorism (including anthrax poison-
ing, which was a momentary frenzy because of a few widely reported cases)
was high, when it is in fact quite low relative to the danger presented by
everyday activities, such as driving, going to a bar or restaurant, or mowing
the lawn.
The Schwarcz thesis posits that oppressive or inefficient insurance pol-
icy terms exact significant social cost because policyholders are left with a
significant loss for which they are unable to spread and manage risk after
the loss has taken place. By contrast, judicial regulation of coverage in such
cases "will typically be a small loss relative to the insurer's net assets, [which
means] the insurer is not particularly harmed by bearing that risk."" State
legislative or administrative regulation is unlikely to be optimally effec-
tive at stemming this social cost because of the political clout of insurers
and the prospect of regulatory capture or inadequate resources regarding
insurance commissioner offices."8 Regarding judicial regulation, Schwarcz
sees the reasonable expectations approach to policy construction as too
flawed to correct the problem. 9
B. Improving Upon the Product Liability Model
Professor Schwarcz's article is a major contribution to insurance law and
insurance coverage theory. His defective product-market correction-avoid
55. See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1412-15. In addition, the value of reputation evidence
is often both overrated and comparatively low due to insurer marketing and an apparent
strategy of treating policyholders well on small claims but being quite willing to deny or resist
a large claim, which is the type of claim a consumer is less likely to experience and hence
less likely to communicate to his or her social networks. Id. at 1414-15. Although insurance
intermediaries can be helpful in enhancing consumer or small business policyholder under-
standing, this mode of information transmittal and market regulation is also problematic. Id.
at 1415-19. Secondary literature, such as Consumer Reports, is also of reduced value for insur-
ance, as compared to most consumer products. Id. at 1419.
56. Id. at 1420-21.
57. Id. at 1423.
58. Id. at 1424-25.
59. Id. at 1426-35.
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opportunism approach to judicial policing of insurance policies is a major
step forward in legal thinking about insurance and the policyholder-insurer
relation, one that deserves to be widely read, considered, and, under appro-
priate circumstances, applied by the courts. Notwithstanding its impres-
siveness, its use of the concept of an insurance policy as a product is unduly
limited. Rather than being utilized only as a means of justifying judicial
regulation of insurance by imposing coverage in the face of seemingly con-
trary text, the insurance-as-product approach presents a valuable interpre-
tative tool for insurance coverage disputes generally and determining the
apt construction to be accorded to policy text, the meaning of which is
often unclear, at least if the text is viewed in isolation.
Another arguably unnecessary limitation of the Schwarcz insurance-as-
product approach is that it could be interpreted as applying only to con-
sumer insurance products.60 The rationale for this limitation appears to
stem from product liability law imputing knowledge of product limitations
and means of sue to experienced purchasers, as well as the widespread no-
tion of insurance law that individuals may need greater judicial protection
in coverage matters than do commercial entities. The so-called sophisti-
cated policyholder defenses to coverage or bad faith claims incorporate
much of this thinking. Under this view, often proffered by insurers wishing
to avoid the imposition of either the reasonable expectations approach or
the ambiguity doctrine when litigating coverage disputes with commer-
cial policyholders, neither approach to contract construction would apply
when the policyholder is a frequent purchaser of substantial insurance or
has assistance from brokers or legal counsel. 61
60. Id. at 1395-96.
61. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 4.11 (discussing insurance
coverage and "sophisticated policyholder" arguments); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 1,
§ 1.03 [c] (suggesting that ambiguity principle should not be available to sophisticated com-
mercial policyholders); Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39
TORT, TRIAL & INS. L.J. 85 (2003) (opposing different rules for sophisticated policyholders);
Jeffrey W Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated" Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage
Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 807 (1993) (policyholder sophistication may properly be con-
sidered in determining intent, objective, expectations, and understanding but not to alter
normal interpretative groundrules protecting policyholders). See, e.g., Eagle Leasing Corp. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 E2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Missouri law) ("We do
not feel compelled to apply, or indeed, justified in applying the general rule that an insurance
policy is construed against the insurer in the commercial insurance field when the insured is
not an innocent but a corporation of immense size, carrying insurance with annual premiums
in six figures, managed by sophisticated business men, and represented by counsel at the same
professional level as the counsel for insurers. In substance, the authorship of the policy is
attributable to both parties alike); McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 645 E Supp. 525(D.N.J. 1986) (noting that policyholder, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, was large com-
pany with risk management department, broker, and counsel assistance; finding it implausible
that McNeilab could interpret standard CGL policy to provide product recall coverage). But
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However, it is overbroad and oversimplified to attempt to divide the
world of policyholders into consumers and businesses (or even to divide
it according to wealth or volume of insurance business). The acumen, re-
sources, and sophistication of consumers can vary widely. Warren Buffett,
Bill Gates, and Donald Trump all purchase insurance as consumers, but
their context for these purchases is quite different than that of the average
citizen. Similarly, there is a wide spectrum of experience, knowledge, re-
sources, and sophistication regarding insurance among commercial policy-
holders. To continue the same analogy, the insurance-buying experience
of General Electric, Ford, or Google is likely to be considerably different
than that of a small shop owner, lawn service, plumber, or electrician.
Further, even large businesses differ considerably in their sophistication
and capacity for evaluating insurance policies. Some companies, even rela-
tively small ones, are assisted by their own risk managers, savvy brokers,
and experienced coverage counsel. Some may even draft or co-draft policy
language clarifying and memorializing their insuring agreements. Other
companies, in spite of their comparative size and wealth, may have no in-
house risk management or legal expertise, may employ only mediocre bro-
kers or counsel, or may, in a hard market, have no realistic choice regarding
policy forms offered for coverage. Here, size matters in the sense that a
company must realistically be of a minimum size in order to self-insure or
form its own captive insurer or must be part of an industry or trade group
that, through collective action, can form a supportive captive insurer or
risk retention group.
For these reasons, the sophistication of a type of policyholder cannot
be assumed, but must be assessed on a case-specific basis. The degree of
a policyholder's sophistication, once determined, may then have conse-
quences regarding what understanding the policyholder had of a term or
insuring arrangement and whether its expectations are objectively reason-
able under the circumstances. Similarly, but with less dramatic variance,
insurers may differ in these traits as well, which may have implications re-
garding a given insurer's intent, purpose, understanding, and expectations
regarding an insurance policy.
A more limiting aspect of the Schwarcz insurance-as-product analysis is
that it appears to operate from the presumption that most insurance policy
text is in fact clear and that problems arise when a court is asked to apply
see Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 681 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (rejecting argu-
ment that sophisticated policyholder may not benefit from contra proferentem principle);
Boeing Co. v. Aema Cas. & Surety Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990) (same). See also Madden v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (ambiguity analysis inapt where contract was
negotiated rather than standard form generated by one party).
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clear text under circumstances where this seem unfair to the policyholder
or at odds with the overall insuring arrangement. One can therefore take a
limited view of the Schwarcz methodology as one to use in place not only
of reasonable expectations analysis, but also in lieu of unconscionability
or public policy policing of insurance policies. Limited to just this niche
of insurance law, the Schwarcz suggestions are nonetheless valuable and
may find warmer reception from courts (and perhaps even from insurers)
than these other doctrines, which are often seen as too result-oriented,
too unpredictable, too pro-policyholder, and insufficiently principled and
consistent.
More promising still is a broader application of the insurance-policy-as-
thing approach, one that is not restricted to consumer or individual poli-
cies and is not dependent on market failure or inefficiency alone in order to
support policy construction that avoids textual literalism. The insurance-
as-product approach should be used not only in cases where policy text is
seen as clear, but arguably oppressive, but should also be applied as an aid
to judicial analysis regarding the meaning of policy text itself. In this fash-
ion, the insurance-as-thing construct helps to inform (or substitute for) not
only unconscionability, public policy, and reasonable expectations analysis,
but also inform textual interpretation and the discernment of party intent
and purpose associated with the insurance at issue in a dispute.
Without a doubt, insurance policies have much in common with tangi-
ble goods and are not "pure" contracts like the type of party-crafted agree-
ments that formed the basis of traditional and much modern contract law.
In addition to the product-like features of insurance noted by Professor
Schwarcz, overwhelming practical evidence supports the view that insur-
ance policies are as much products as contracts. In the real world of insur-
ance, brokers, carriers, and risk managers are perhaps the farthest along
on this dimension. The insurance trade press (e.g., Best's Review, National
Underwriter, Business Insurance, Insurance Journal) routinely speaks of insur-
ance policies as "products" to be researched, designed, unveiled, marketed,
and sold in the manner of manufactured goods.62 Insurers are sometimes
62. See, e.g., Darwin Launches New Clinical Research Liability Product, Team, INS. J., Apr. 5,
2007, at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2007/04/05/78495.htm; The Hart-
ford Erpands Professional Liability Product for Tech Firms, INS. J., July 17, 2006, at http://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/07/17/70528.htm; ICAT, National Fire and Marine
Launch New Catastrophe Product, INS.J. (Mar. 16, 2006), at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/
news/national/2006/03/16/66540.htm; Robert Grubka, What The New Annuity-LTC Combo
Products Might Look Like, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Mar. 5, 2007, at http://www.nationalunder
writer.com/LTC/articles/20074feature.asp. See also ToM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POL-
ICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 46 (2003) (noting this customary jargon of insurance
industry).
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said to "unveil" a new policy form63 in the manner of a new model year of
automobiles or an electronic innovation, such as Apple's iPhone (although
it is probably safe to say that no one camped out overnight to be first in
line for a new insurance policy). Insurance e-mail services regularly speak
of products of "programs" to provide coverage and may talk of "custom-
izing" the insurance purchased. 64 Although this type of portrayal is not in-
consistent with insurance policies as contracts, it is clearly consistent with
viewing the insurance policy as a product as well.
Not only do those in the insurance industry see policies as products, but
apparently, so do consumers and marketing experts. According to a study
released in 2007, baby boomer policyholders (those born between 1946
and 1964) regard insurance as a good of sorts, albeit one with a substan-
tial service component. According to the survey, baby boomer consumers
displayed higher "brand loyalty" toward insurance than to almost all other
products, with more than two-thirds expressing high brand loyalty toward
their insurers. This compared to brand loyalty of roughly 25 percent for
televisions, computers, and clothing, with home appliances evincing only
slightly greater loyalty.
6
63. See ACE Unveils "Spectrum" P/C Policy, INs. J., June 18, 2007, at http://www.insurance
journal.com/news/internationalU2007/O6/1 8 /8 0 8 7 2 .htm (noting insurer's "launch[ing]" of
new policy which combines "range of P&C covers" and marketing it as insurance policy with
coverage broader than that in "many traditional package wordings").
64. See, e.g., MyNewMarkets.com, July 2, 2007, at www.mynewmarkets.com (advertising
rental equipment dealers insurance "program" and yacht insurance that allows "customiza-
tion of coverages, limits, and deductibles to meet individual needs and budgets").
65. See Baby Boomers Stay Loyal to Insurance Brand, Study Reveals, INs. J., May 15, 2007,
at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/ 2 0 0 7/05/15/79724.htm. Consumer loy-
alty broke down as follows in a study conducted by market research firm Focalyst. The
highest brand loyalty exhibited was enjoyed by auto insurance (72 percent), home insurance
(72 percent), medical insurance (67 percent), and life insurance (65 percent), followed by
banks at 63 percent. The lowest brand loyalty was "enjoyed" by manufacturers of televisions
(22 percent), computers (24 percent), clothing (27 percent), home appliances (30 percent),
and prepared foods (36 percent). According to a Focalyst marketing director, "[b]oomers are
most loyal when companies give customized service, a natural reflection of Boomers' desire
for personalized attention and rewarding brand experiences."
However, the Focalyst study, at least as portrayed in news reports, may be overlooking
some significant advantages held by insurance companies in the struggle for brand loyalty.
Simply put, it is much harder to change insurance policies than to try out a new brand of shirt
or new type of food. For example, changing insurers involves higher search costs and more
difficult comparisons, as well as substantially more paperwork, including the comparative
hassle of canceling former policies.
Insurance also tends to automatically renew, which is likely to keep consumers with the
same carrier. By contrast, some of the items with low brand loyalty tend to be hard goods that
eventually wear out or break down. When this happens, the consumer is essentially starting
from scratch. Unless he or she is highly satisfied with the brand of machine that just stopped
working, the consumer has a strong incentive to shop the market on the basis of price, model,
or styling rather than brand name, per se.
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Readers may also recall that beginning in 2006, State Farm was advertis-
ing (something it, like most major insurers, does constantly to promote its
product in a manner more like a vendor than an entity engaged in contract
offer, negotiation, and acceptance) by comparing its product to a first class
airline in which passengers were pampered into a crowded coach class cattle
car airline in which the same passenger (an attractive blonde woman) was
sandwiched between two obese, obnoxious, inebriated male passengers.
The State Farm pitch: why not pay a little more for better service from
local, service-oriented agents rather than buying based on price alone.
In a second version of this type of advertisement, State Farm is analo-
gized to the NFL linemen who protect Seattle Seahawks quarterback Matt
Further, changing life insurance may involve loss of investment potential and higher pre-
miums because the switching policyholder is, by definition, older and more expensive when
approaching a subsequent life insurer. Perhaps, then, it is unsurprising that the non-insurance
entities with highest brand loyalty are banks. Particularly where depositors have automatic
deposit and automatic bill payment, switching banks, like switching insurers, entails higher
transaction costs than buying a new TV from a different manufacturer, especially when the
old TV needed to be replaced in any event.
Marketing and brand loyalty aside, the important point for purposes of this article is that
insurance appears not to be regarded as a contractual agreement so much as a type of retail
good that is designed, assembled, sold, and serviced by the insurer. In addition, it appears that,
even in the high brand loyalty world of insurance, consumers will make changes when they
have a bad experience with the insurer. See 75% ofAuto Insurance Shoppers Who Met with Poor
Service Switch Carriers, Survey Finds, INS. J., June 27, 2007, at http://www.insurancejournal.
com/news/nationalI2007/06/27/81147.htn. An "Insurance Shopping Study" by J.D. Power
and Associates found that, when a policyholder had a bad claims experience with an insurer,
the policyholder was willing to shop around for new coverage, with the average such con-
sumer obtaining "three competitive quotes while shopping for a new provider," and one third
of these shoppers ultimately switching carriers. The study also found that almost "40 percent
of shoppers look for auto and homeowners insurance bundles" and that the percentage of
policyholders reporting a satisfying insurance shopping experience ranged between 5 percent
and 43 percent.
As these surveys indicated, policyholders appear to shop for insurance, not according to
contractual analysis, but on the basis of pricing and the sales experience. For the bulk of policy-
holders, it appears that they-like the insurance industry-really do regard the insurance pol-
icy as a thing more than a contract.
Interestingly, this study concerning consumer brand loyalty to insurance products, which
is consistent with previous data regarding policyholder loyalty, was the second-most accessed
story for the electronic version of Insurance Journal during the week of June 26, 2007, out-
pacing even the imminent opening of Michael Moore's movie Sicko and the House of Rep-
resentatives passage of surplus lines insurance reform. See Weekly Reader Picks, INs.J. (July 2,
2007). Clearly, the insurance industry is very interested in the branding and marketing of its
products. See also Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1413-15 (summarizing studies and concluding
that policyholders are generally quite loyal to insurer regardless of whether insurer is likely
to provide necessary coverage for large risks of significance or whether policies purchased are
appropriate to consumer needs). See, e.g., Ins. Research Council, Public Attitude Monitor 2000,
Issue 2, at 5 (only 7 percent of homeowners' or renters' policyholder changed insurers during
five-year period); Ins. Research Council, Public Attitude Monitor 2001, Issue 2, at 6 (majority
of consumers rely on word of mouth referrals, insurer advertisements (23 percent for auto in-
surance), television (10 percent), and yellow pages (14 percent) for information on insurance;
no significance attached to familiarity with policy content itself).
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Hasselbeck (remember, these ads ran before the team's disastrous 2008
season) while other insurers are compared to a Pee Wee team unable to
stop marauding defenders (resulting in an unpleasant sack of Hasselbeck).
Although this ad campaign was selling the service component of insurance,
it is also consistent with the idea that insurance is a thing (i.e., access to
better service like a service agreement with a reputable appliance repair
operation) rather than a detailed bilateral contract between insurer and
policyholder.
The status of insurance policies as products is further cemented by the
longstanding ISO practice of copyrighting its standard insurance forms, a
practice followed by many insurers as well. Further, insurers may be able
to successfully sue one another for copyright infringement based on one
insurer's use of another's structure, design, and language of the policy, on
the theory that the insurance policy is a copyrightable expression of an idea
that may be infringed upon." Although courts historically have disfavored
such copyright infringement actions, the tide may be turning67 as part of a
trend of a general expansion of the reach of intellectual property law and
its protection. 68 For example, insurers not only seek to copyright insurance
products, but even to patent them, as if the insurance policy or annuity
program were an electronic device or computer.
69
66. See Martin J. Bishop, Copyright Protection for Insurance Policies, RISK MGMT., May 2006,
at 42. See, e.g., Am. Family Life Ins. Co. of Columbus v. Assurant, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8781 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2006). See also David G. Luettgen, Supreme Court Decides Two
Patent Cases That May Shape Intellectual Property Landscape Faced By Insurers, June 14, 2007, at
www.mondaq.comn/article.asp?articleid=49336&email-access=on (discussing insurer interest
in patenting insurance products and implications of KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398 (2007), and Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) ("It is anticipated that
most insurance companies will not change their approach to filing patent applications in
response to KSR, at least not right away.... For insurance companies with business in other
countries outside the United States, the Microsoft decision means that the foreign operations
of such companies are less likely to get ensnared in a dispute relating to U.S. patents.")).
67. See Bishop, supra note 66.
68. Remember, we live in a world where the letters between author J.D. Salinger (The
Catcher in the Rye) and Judge Learned Hand have been copyrighted and protected by judicial
enforcement (see Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 E2d 90 (1987)) and where an NBA
basketball coach successfully copyrighted the term "three-peat" to describe efforts of the
Los Angeles Lakers to win the NBA title in three successive years (see Todd D. Kantorczyk,
How to Stop the Fast Break: An Evaluation of the "Three-Peat" Trademark and the FTC's Role in
Trademark Law Enforcement, 2 UCLA ENr. L. Riv. 195 (1995)).
69. See Luettgen, supra note 66:
Twenty years ago, a Supreme Court decision on patents would have drawn collective yawns
from many segments of the business community. In recent years, however, interest in in-
tellectual property has increased as the percentage of corporate value that is tied up in
intangible assets has increased. Insurance companies are at the forefront of this trend, with
things like underwriting techniques and innovative product features often being considered
the "crown jewels of the company." As a result, intellectual property now may play a signifi-
cant role in the future fortunes of insurers.
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Although patent/copyright and contract are not necessarily inconsistent,
the copywriting of insurance policies, at least if taken seriously, is further
evidence of the degree to which insurance has become some-"thing" rather
than merely a bilateral contractual agreement. Copyrighted words are gen-
erally part of something sold and read on a mass market basis, such as
a book. A patent usually concerns a product or method and not a deal
between parties. One does not ordinarily think of one's contracts as being
something to read or purchase as a possession. Although contractual rights
have value and constitute a type of property, that value has historically been
thought to stem from the contracting parties' commitment rather than
characteristics of the contract itself. In the modern world of insurance,
however, the policies not only seem more like things, they are treated as
things by insurers and marketed that way as well.70
A simple hypothetical illustrates the manner in which an interpreter's
set of presumed tools for construction can have a powerful impact on the
meaning attached to a contract or the liabilities associated with a product.
If one buys something called a "hammer," one would expect that the device
would not disintegrate upon impact with nails, wood, or other building
material. Imagine if the "hammer" were packaged in a box that stated that
the "name of this product is for identification purposes only; this product
should not be considered capable of pounding nails or surviving impact
with other building materials." The purchaser of the now disintegrated-
on-impact "hammer" would be entitled to a refund and probably would
70. See Steven Plitt, A Systematic Approach to Coverage Analysis, IN-HousE DEFENSE Q.,
Winter 2007, at 56, 56-59 (urging coverage counsel to "[p]erform a policy inventory" and to
"[k]now the policy architecture" as well as to "[ulnderstand what is being insured and why").
According to Plitt, a well-known insurer attorney and co-author of Couch on Insurance 3d:
Coverage analysis involving standardized policy forms can become routine and cover-
age counsel sometimes take shortcuts in coming to the ultimate coverage determination.
Shortcuts are often the product of preconceived assumptions on the part of coverage coun-
sel leading counsel to not carefully and methodically review a new coverage assignment.
Proper coverage analysis, however, requires a dedication to the performance of routine
analytic steps that must be completed for each coverage assignment.
Id. at 56.
Although Plitt and I would probably disagree somewhat about the degree to which the
precise text of a policy defines the product as opposed to the degree to which the product
informs the construction of its text, his advocacy of a systemic approach to coverage analysis
is consistent with the insurance as product approach and flows from this perspective. It also
suggests that agents, brokers, and lawyers dealing with insurance policies are in many ways
similar to salespersons and consultants dealing with particular products.
For example, a pharmaceutical company's "detail" persons inform doctors about the com-
pany's drugs (and strive for sales) by emphasizing the product as a whole and its function
for particular cases. They do not regale doctors with information as to the drug's chemical
makeup and, if product liability litigation is any guide, appear not to dwell on textual warnings
regarding the drugs.
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have a successful product liability claim if injured during the disintegra-
tion. Even if the disclaimer on the package were quite conspicuous, it is
unlikely a court would find it sufficient to overcome the presumption that
something called a hammer is capable of surviving the type of impacts to
which a hammer is ordinarily subjected.
A similar issue arises with insurance policies, although the discussion
often focuses on the language of the insuring agreement itself rather than
the title of the policy or any of its specific sections. This is the well-known
rule that, although it is the policyholder's burden to prove coverage, an in-
surer relying on an exclusion bears the burden of persuasion to clearly show
the applicability of the exclusion, which is strictly construed against the in-
surer. If the insurer shoulders that burden, a policyholder seeking to rely on
an exception to the exclusion bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
the applicability of the exclusion.7 Applied to the disintegrating "hammer"
example, this approach to insurance policies would first determine whether
something called a hammer is something that should not shatter upon con-
tact with building materials, a showing easily made by the consumer. In
response, the manufacturer (like an insurer) would seek to eject (exclude)
this understanding of the term "hammer" by pointing to the disclaimer (ex-
clusion) on the package.
If a case like the disintegrating hammer is treated under a contract
model, resolution of a dispute can be difficult. On the one hand, a hammer
should be able to survive impact. On the metaphorical other hand, the ven-
dor of the device did have a disclaimer. If the disclaimer were sufficiently
clear and conspicuous, a contract approach standing alone might absolve
the hammer-maker (and seller) of breach of warranty or liability. In the
insurance context, a similar situation could arise if the homeowner's policy
contained a broad insuring clause but then contained a fire exclusion. Even
if the fire exclusion were in large print, it would be hard to imagine its en-
forcement unless it was specifically called to the attention of a prospective
policyholder, agreed to prior to sale of the policy, and resulted in a price
reduction relative to ordinary policies that provide basic fire protection.
But, as a matter of bare contract jurisprudence, certainly as a matter
of textual analysis alone, the case is close. Traditional contract theory has
several responses to assist in reaching the right result when a court is con-
fronted with this jurisprudential/textual bind. The court could find that,
in selling a "hammer," the vendor had made a misleading representation
that it was now estopped to avoid." The court could also apply a "strong"
71. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 1, § 1.01; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 1, § 2.06[C]; FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 2.11.
72. See MARTINEZ & WHELAN, supra note 1, at 154--72; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 1, § 5.02: ANDERSON, STANZLER & MASTERS, supra note 1, § 12.02.
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version of the reasonable expectations doctrine and hold that the hammer
user had an objectively reasonable expectation that it would pound nails
and survive, and that even a clear disclaimer could not negate this expecta-
tion. The court could also escape the problematic text of the disclaimer by
terming its application as bringing about an "absurd" result.
Under the extreme circumstances of the hammer hypothetical, any of
these extratextual means of avoiding the impact of the disclaimer seems
justified and would not constitute impermissible judicial disregard of con-
tract text or a "voluntary agreement" of the parties. Certainly, there was
no mutual intent to facilitate use of a disintegrating hammer and no shared
purpose in obtaining such an instrument. An eclectic, nuanced contract
doctrine that does not become myopically enamored of the "plain lan-
guage" of a contract's text can escape the folly of the disintegrating ham-
mer or the homeowner's policy that does not cover fire loss.
However, consideration of the product-like aspects of an insurance pol-
icy as well as its contract attributes, makes it easier to render an opinion in
the case of the disintegrating hammer. Considering the product-like status
of insurance provides a sound adjunct to conventional contract analysis
in avoiding the absurdity of the home policy that provides no fire cover-
age, just as viewing the hammer as a product rather than merely the ob-
ject of a contractual exchange makes it cleaner and easier to declare that
the vendor of the disintegrating hammer should not be compensated and
should have to pay reasonably foreseeable damages caused by its defective
composition."
Insurance policy construction and resolution of coverage disputes could
well profit from more self-conscious appreciation of the degree to which
an insurance policy is much like a product sold with a particular purpose in
mind. Even if the product's packaging, label, and instruction booklet does
not specifically delineate the contours of the product's use, knowing the
type of product in question can assist in determining what the product can
reasonably be expected to do in a particular context.
73. In my view, even the clearly worded disclaimer of the disintegrating hammer hypo-
thetical should not constitute an effective warning that relieves the vendor of responsibility
for injury proximately flowing from the product, although the question is one better suited
for torts specialists. Warning based defenses to product liability claims make sense as a means
of apprising the user of dangers associated with typical use of the ordinary, properly named
product. For example, a warning that cautioned against the airborne debris that can be cre-
ated through typical use of a hammer (e.g., in tearing out sheetrock) would probably be ef-
fective to preclude a claim by a worker who got hit by a flying piece of a wall being torn
down. But a warning should not logically be effective to negate liability where the thing sold
is intrinsically something other than the product it is purported to be and where ordinary use
in the manner of the intended product produces injury because the product does not measure
up to minimum standards.
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Viewing the insurance contract as a product as well as an "agreement"
can help courts and counsel synthesize the various stands of mainstream
contract theory. For example, appreciating the product-like function of an
insurance policy informs the meaning of policy text, not only clarifying
ambiguous text but also providing context for assessing the meaning of
words that may or may not mean what they seem to mean in the absence
of context. Similarly, knowing the attributes of the insurance product pre-
vents inquiry into party intent or contract purpose from becoming a mere
exercise in sifting though self-serving, party-presented evidence of what
they thought or sought in connection with a policy sale. A sense of the con-
tours of the insurance product also serves to set parameters on the asserted
reasonable expectations of policyholders and insurers.
The real "contract" made by the parties is their agreement and the writ-
ten documentation of the agreement is just that-"mere" documentation
and not the agreement itself. Although lawyers and judges refer to the
piece of paper memorializing an agreement as "the contract," it really is
a "contract document" that endeavors to record the agreement. Because
commercial contracts and insurance policies are frequently lengthy and
detailed, these contract documents often address matters not actually dis-
cussed by the parties. This tends to give the text of contract documents
more interpretative influence in these situations than would exist, for ex-
ample, in a one-page agreement reflecting the sale of an old kitchen table
to a neighbor. Nonetheless, the principle remains: the memorialization of
the contract is not the contract. As well put by three contracts scholars:
People often use the word "contract" to refer to the writing that embodies the
agreement or deal.
But the piece of paper is not a "contract." . . . At most, the piece of paper is a
memorialization of the contract....
[T]here is a tendency to confuse the written paper signed by the parties with
the contract that binds them. It is an easy mistake to make; everyone calls
the signed paper "the contract." But that paper is, at best, only evidence of
the contract. That is, the contract is represented by that paper; it is not that
paper....
[A contract is] "a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty."74
74. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, MAmuNG AND Do-
ING DEALS: CoNTRAcTs IN CONTEXT 1, 458 (2d ed. 2006) (citing Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 1). To underscore their point, the authors note that if the contract documents really
were "the contract," then
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The importance of intent, purpose, and expectations factors in contract
construction is reflected in cases considering the parties course of perfor-
mance and course of dealing, as well as the industry's usage in trade as part
of determining meaning and construing text.75 In addition, contract mean-
ing will often be fleshed out through the application of implied terms.76
if you tore the paper up (or spilled coffee on it) you would also tear up or water down
the parties' obligations. While that may be the case with some types of obligations (such
as checks or other negotiable instruments), that is not the case with regular, every day
contracts.
Id. at 458. There is an insurance application of this concept. A policyholder may prove entitle-
ment to coverage even if it no longer has a copy of the policy (even in the face of an insurer's
denial it ever sold insurance to the policyholder) if the policyholder has other credible evi-
dence that it purchased insurance from the insurer. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 1,
§§ 17.02-17.04; FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 4.10.
75. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.13; EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 74,
Ch. 4. See, e.g., Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 526 P.2d 676 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (court
decides question of responsibility for damage to equipment based on industry norms rather
than text of contract documents or invocation of ambiguity doctrine) (excerpted in EPSTEIN,
MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 74, at 459-62).
These concepts of intra-party or intra-industry understanding as determining contract
meaning can be seen as a movement from the general to the specific. Usage in trade refers to
the custom, practice, and general understanding of an industry as a whole. Course of dealing
refers to the history of contracting relations between the parties to the instant dispute. Course
of performance refers to the history of the parties' understandings and behaviors regarding
a particular contract. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.13; EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF,
supra note 74, Ch. 4.
In general, as in textual interpretation, the specific tends to have more authority than the
general. The parties' course of performance is usually more important to a court than their
course of dealing, which is in turn more influential than overall industry or trade custom. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.13; EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 74.
Because commercial actors may be involved in a stream of similar interactions over time,
with "relational" contracts with one another, the line between course of performance and
course of dealing may be a bit blurred. For example, are two shipments of widgets two sepa-
rate contracts (course of dealing) or part of the same contract (course of performance)? In
most cases, the answer does not affect the interpretative outcome. See generally Stewart Mac-
Cauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963)
(scholarly article generally credited with first articulating "relational contract" concept); Ian
MacNeil, The Many Faces of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974). See also FARNSWORTH,
supra note 5, § 7.13; EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra note 74 at 198-201; IAN MAcNEIL,
THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980).
For purposes of insurance, the analogous point largely occurs with renewal of insurance
policies or when a policyholder regularly purchases insurance through a particular insurer or
agent. In insurance law, a body of precedent has grown up which limits the force of exclusionary
text contained in renewal or rolling insurance policies if adverse changes are not drawn to the
policyholder's attention. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 4.09[D][2].
See, e.g., Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W2d 570, 572 (Minn.
1977).
76. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 2.13, 7.17; EPSTEIN, MARKELL & PONOROFF, supra
note 74, at 542-603. Perhaps the most famous implied terms case is then-Judge Benjamin
Cardozo's opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), a staple of
contract course casebooks, in which the court held that it was implied, as part of distribution
and sales agreement or franchise, that the holder of contract rights would make reasonable
best efforts to in fact sell and distribute the merchandise to which the contract party had rights.
HeinOnline -- 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 839 2008-2009
840 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Spring/Summer 2009 (44:3-4)
Further, the concept of good faith and fair dealing can provide additional
meaning to a contract by requiring that the parties make certain reasonable
efforts or refrain from conduct that deprives other parties of the benefit of
the bargain.77
Notwithstanding that "the paper is not the contract," there is a strong
presumption that the text of the contract documentation reflects the agree-
ment of the parties. This presumption becomes particularly strong where
the contract is long and complex because the written contract documents
may address, in detail, aspects of the arrangement that were not directly
addressed in negotiations. However, even in the absence of specific discus-
sion, there may be an established understanding of the basic contours of
coverage because of the nature of the policy, business community under-
standing, or past practices.
C. Existing Recognition of the Product-Like Aspects
of Insurance Policies
The "Insurance Contract as Thing" or "Insurance Policy as Product" ap-
proach has obvious similarities to the reasonable expectations approach
to insurance policy construction. Under the reasonable expectations ap-
proach in its strongest form, coverage disputes are resolved by provid-
ing coverage consistent with the objectively reasonable expectations of the
policyholder even though "painstaking" study of the policy text may have
negated those expectations." In its more common and more moderate
form, the reasonable expectations approach requires that uncertain con-
tract language be interpreted in a manner consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the disputants, with more solicitude given to the under-
standing of the policyholder.79 Like the reasonable expectations approach,
the insurance-contract-as-thing approach will tend to be less literalist and
77. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, §§ 10.01, 10.02; Market Street
Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 21 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wisconsin law).
78. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 4.09; Roger C. Henderson, The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 Oiio ST. LJ. 823,
(1990); Keeton, supra note 16.
79. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 4.09. Some scholars describe
the reasonable expectations approach as considering only the policyholder's reasonable ex-
pectations. See, e.g., OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 1, § 1.03[b]; ALAN I. WIDISS, INSUR-
ANCE: MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND REGULATORY ACTS
Ch. 6 (1989); Kenneth Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. RE. 1151, 1154 (1981) (finding reasonable
expectations principle invoked with some frequency for consumer policyholders but seldom
for commercial policyholders. However, for reasons set forth at greater length elsewhere,
I view the reasonable expectations doctrine as applicable to both policyholders and insurers
and find that courts frequently consider the reasonable expectations of insurers regarding
their contractual commitments to policyholders, even if cases taking this into account do
not always use reasonable expectations terminology. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra, § 4.09;Jeffrey W Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance
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less worshipful of the text of contract documents as well as prompting a
broader interpretative focus. Consequently, like the reasonable expecta-
tions approach, it is likely to be an interpretative construct opposed (at
least officially) by most insurers, which have an inherent advantage over
policyholders in that insurers are repeat players that can recur to the draft-
ing table after litigation losses and amortize such losses across books of
business and years of risk.
In taking this position, insurers and their counsel tend to cast themselves
in the role of principled defenders of cautious jurisprudence and opponents
of "judicial activism" that results in the "rewriting" of contract language.
Textualism, of course, can be defended as more objective and less likely to
lead to the improper imposition of a court's personal preferences in adju-
dication. But textualism, like inflexible formalism, can be a false god that
leads to incorrect or bad outcomes when construing contracts or statutes
and giving them the force of law.
In addition, the insurance industry position of purporting to favor text
and regarding most other means of contract construction as illegitimate
stems from historical and sociological factors affecting insurers. As noted
above, insurance policies are heavily standardized. This is most obvious
in the mainstream property and casualty market, where policies sold to
individuals and Fortune 500 corporations alike are largely patterned on set
forms authored by the ISO. If the standard policies are altered, it is usually
by way of an ISO-drafted endorsement rather than through any custom-
ized or newly created contract language.
ISO essentially works for the insurance industry and attempts to issue
forms that meet the needs of mainstream property and casualty insurers.
Although many insurers (e.g., the St. Paul Companies' plain language
forms; the standard forms of Bermuda-based carriers such as ACE and XL;
those of Lloyd's or London Market entities) use their own standardized
forms, the variance in form language and coverage offered is not substan-
tial. For the most part, insurance policies are industrywide products that
are sold in the manner of manufactured goods. Certainly, this is the situa-
tion for most insurance sales to consumers or small businesses. Insurance
policies for larger businesses or wealthy individuals may be negotiated in
After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 440-64 (2006) (noting insurer victories
in long-running asbestos coverage wars that appear to result more from judicial solicitude
for insurer expectations and financial burdens more than strict reading of policy language);
Jeffrey W Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Erpectations Ap-
proach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CoN. INS. LJ. 181, 245-72 (1998) (same
observation regarding other types of coverage disputes). See also Swisher, supra note 17, at
733-35 (finding that fusion of reasonable expectations thinking and ambiguity analysis domi-
nates insurance coverage law, with reasonable expectations of parties used to construe unclear
policy text but not to overcome clear policy text).
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the manner of contracts, but the negotiation proceeds under the initial
framing provided by standardized insurance products.
The same situation largely holds for life, health, and disability policies,
although there exists more variance in this area because of the absence of
a central drafting organization such as the ISO. Nonetheless, almost all of
life/health/disability policies look alike and use the same terminology, with
only modest variance that is usually itself part of a standard menu of op-
tions similar to the manner in which ISO policies are varied by preprinted
endorsement much more often than by particularized negotiation. Because
of this history, custom, and "capital investment" in standardized or com-
mon policy language by insurers, they are reluctant to support any contract
construction methodology that does not give dominant or exclusive focus
to the text on the face of the policy documents.8"
However, insurers frequently make arguments against coverage that are
not text-based and may even contradict policy text. For example, in an
important California Supreme Court case, insurers and their amici argued
that the policyholder's CGL policy only provided defense and coverage
of tort claims because this was the understanding about and design of the
CGL. However, the court properly rejected this view, both because the
policy text stated that it covered suits alleging "property damage" against
the policyholder, and because the reality of the nature of the plaintiff's
claim was more important than its technical legal characterization in view
of the CGL policy's role in providing general liability protection to policy-
holders. The case involved a "breach of lease" claim that was centered on
the defendant policyholder's despoiling and polluting of the plaintiff own-
er's land. l
Insurers tend to dislike the ambiguity doctrine as much or more than
the reasonable expectations doctrine. In most cases, of course, the insurer
is the drafter of policy language and likely to lose a dispute over unclear
policy language-unless the insurer can convince the court that there are
extrinsic factors supporting the insurer's construction of the disputed term.
When arguing against application of the ambiguity approach against them,
insurers frequently make implicit insurance-contract-as-thing/insurance-
as-product arguments in that they argue that the policy in question was
never designed to provide the type of coverage sought by the policyholder
(or its assignee).
One example is the liability insurer mantra that "a CGL policy is not a
performance bond," which regularly accompanies insurer briefs in cases
80. See Boardman, supra note 50, regarding insurer tendency to retain standardized lan-
guage, even if problematic.
81. See Vandenberg v. Superior Ct., 982 P2d 229 (Cal. 1999).
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seeking to avoid coverage in construction defect cases and is regularly re-
peated in court decisions.82 The notion underlying this aphorism is that
liability policies are designed to provide protection to the policyholder in
cases of fortuitous events leading to third party claims of injury but are not
intended to provide coverage where a policyholder is simply accused of
shoddy work and asked to redo the work or refund the purchase price to
a dissatisfied customer. But nowhere does the standard CGL policy state
that it is not a performance bond. To be sure, insurers attempt to me-
morialize this concept in the various business risk exclusions found in the
typical CLG policy (e.g., the "your work," "your property," "care, custody
or control," and "impaired property" exclusions).83 But, in arguing for the
applicability of some or all of these textual exclusions to coverage, liabil-
ity insurers regularly attempt-frequently with often deserved success-to
persuade courts of their position by attempting to convince the courts that
the CGL policy simply is not a product designed to cover the type of cus-
tomer dissatisfaction chacteristic of many construction defect cases.
84
In similar fashion, crime and fidelity bond insurers frequently note that
a crime policy is not a liability policy and that it consequently provides
coverage only for direct loss of the policyholder's property-not the at-
tenuated consequences of theft or employee dishonesty.8" As with insurer
arguments against CGL coverage for construction defects suits against the
policyholder, crime insurers can point to policy language favoring their po-
sition. But, in addition to invoking favorable portions of policy text, crime
insurers frequently make a more conceptual argument based on the idea
82. See, e.g., Burlington Ins. Co. v. Oceanic Design & Constr., Inc., 383 E3d 940, 948
(9th Cir. 2004) (applying Hawaii law); Peterson v. Dakota Molding, Inc., 738 N.W2d 501,
508 (N.D. 2007); Kvaerner Metals Div. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899
(Pa. 2006); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W2d 229, 233
(Minn. 1986). See Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed
Operations-What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. Rav. 415, 441 (1971) (CGL policy
is designed to provide coverage for "tort liability for physical damages to others and not for
contractual liability of the insured for economc loss because the product or completed work is
not that for which the person bargained"). See also STEMPEL ON IN SURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 1, § 25.05 [B] (reviewing business risk exclusion in CGL in connection with construction
defect claims).
83. Regarding the "business risk" exclusions typically found in the standard CGL policy,
see STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, §§ 14.01, 25.05[BI[2].
84. Id. § 25.03. See, e.g., Win. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52
E Supp. 2d 569 (E.D.N.C. 1999); Koch Eng'g Co. v. Gibraltar Cas. Co., 878 E Supp. 1286
(E.D. Mo. 1995); Lennar Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 200 S.W3d 651 (Tex. App. 2006);
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 58 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2002); Lerer Corp. v. Assur-
ance Co. of America, 707 A.2d 906 (Md. 1998); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788
(NJ. 1979).
85. See, e.g., Se. Bakery Feeds, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 974 S.W2d 635 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998); La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Acadia Parish Police Jury, 631 So. 2d 611 (La. Ct. App.
1994). See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 22.05.
HeinOnline -- 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 843 2008-2009
844 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Spring/Summer 2009 (44:3-4)
that the crime policy is simply not the type of product that covers policy-
holder problems that emerge indirectly or consequentially from theft or
employee dishonesty.
Insurance policies also frequently contain "intentional act" or "expected
or intended" exclusions that bar coverage where the policyholder can be
said to have willfully brought about a loss or injury for which it now seeks
insurance coverage.8 6 Notwithstanding such policy language, insurers fre-
quently also argue that insurance cannot apply to a situation unless loss or
liability-causing events are "fortuitous."87 Insurer refusals to pay for claims
involving a "known loss,88 a "loss-in-progress"89 or wear-and-tear are sim-
ilarly based not so much on policy language but upon the notion of the
nature and essence of insurance as a concept and as a product. Defenses of
this type are not based on exclusionary language per se, but instead argue
that the very nature of insurance as a product requires that covered claims
are only those where the policyholder has not intended the harm at issue.
In making these types of defenses, often too sweepingly, insurers are, in
essence, arguing that the insurance product is by design and definition
limited in scope to only fortuitous losses (even in the absence of specific
language to that effect).
Similarly, when insurers argue that there has not been a sufficiently ac-
cidental "occurrence" triggering liability coverage,90 they are arguing that
the facts of the loss are inconsistent with the manner in which insurance
works-in effect, arguing that insurance policies are not products designed
to cover such claims. When liability insurers make this argument, they
are arguing that the nature of insurance as a product requires a certain
type of policyholder conduct or state of mind as a prerequisite to coverage
and that merely showing a loss or liability event is not enough. As with
the fortuity defense, insurers frequently overdo the "no accident" or "no
occurrence" defense. But whether rightly or wrongly invoked, it is not so
much a textual defense as a defense based on an argument that the insur-
ance policy is a product or thing that simply does not provide coverage for
policyholder problems that are not sufficiently accidental.
The typical liability policy does not specifically address the question of
whether punitive damages judgments against a policyholder are within
coverage or excluded from coverage (although there are increasing excep-
tions to this norm as insurers and sophisticated policyholders try to clarify
the situation prior to a loss or liability event). When a policyholder with
86. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 1.06[B][1].
87. Id. § 1.06[A].
88. Id. § 1.06[B][2].
89. Id. § 1.06[B][3].
90. Id. §§ 1.06[B][1][g], 14.01[A][2], 25.05[B][3].
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an open-ended policy seeks coverage for punitive damages, insurers pre-
dictably argue that punitives are not within the scope of the policy's cover-
age. But when insurers make these arguments without benefit of a written
exclusion or definitional language excluding punitive damages, they are in
essence arguing that punitives should be excluded because of the inherent
nature of the insurance product, perhaps coupled with an argument that
conduct giving rise to punitive damages is inherently within the expected
and intended exclusion.9'
The latter argument, of course, is largely incorrect. In many jurisdic-
tions, a policyholder may be held liable for punitive damages even where it
did not intend to injure a third party, but was merely willfully indifferent to
its rights, acting in reckless disregard, or (in some states) grossly negligent.
Consequently, the insurer defense to punitive damage coverage is at bot-
tom premised on the notion that insurance coverage for punitive damages
violates public policy. Why, according to insurers, does it violate public
policy? The standard insurer argument is that it is inconsistent with public
policy values to permit a punitive damages wrongdoer to have the pun-
ishing and deterring impact of a punitive award subsidized by insurance
or inflicted upon others through the risk-spreading aspects of insurance.
In other words, insurers frequently argue that coverage of punitive dam-
ages is inconsistent with the nature and intended purpose of the insurance
product.
These types of public policy defenses to punitive damage coverage ap-
pear to succeed somewhat less than half the time, at least where the award
of punitive damages is a form of vicarious liability or where there is no
court finding of intent to injure. However, liability insurers have been re-
markably successful in avoiding coverage for child sex abuse claims against
policyholders, even when plaintiffs' complaints style these claims as "in-
nocent" battery or negligent supervision actions. Insurers have argued, and
courts have generally agreed, that when a child is sexually abused, even by
a perpetrator who does not subjectively think of the act as wrongful, harm
to the child is so practically certain to occur that intent to injure must be
found as a matter of law. Courts have also largely accepted the insurer ar-
gument that a failure to supervise claim against a policyholder that was not
the actual perpetrator of sexual abuse is nonetheless in reality a claim for
sexual abuse that must fall outside policy coverage. When all the rhetoric
is pared away, the insurer in these cases is essentially arguing that coverage
for child sexual abuse is not only too inherently abhorrent to merit insur-
ance coverage, but also that it is conduct so deviant that coverage of its
consequences would be inconsistent with the insurance product.
91. Id. § 1.06[B][5][b].
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III. APPLYING THE INSURANCE POLICY
AS THING CONCEPT: SOME EXAMPLES
A. "Visible Marks" Definition of Burglary
Use of the insurance policy as product concept provides useful insight
into other coverage issues that have divided courts. One is the matter of
whether the "visible marks of entry" requirement in a burglary policy is
to be strictly enforced as written. This coverage question was involved in
a leading reasonable expectations case, Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western
National Mutual Insurance Co., 92 as well as in C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mutual Insurance Co., 93 another leading reasonable expectations case that
more self-consciously viewed the burglary policy as an insurance product
that would not be fit for its intended purpose if the "visible marks of entry"
provision were strictly enforced as a prerequisite to coverage. Applying
this product liability construct to Atwater, Professor Schwarcz notes that
the case
featured a common clause in commercial burglary policies that excluded cov-
erage for burglaries when there were no visible marks of forced entry on any
external doors or windows. The clause encouraged employers to hire trust-
worthy employees, because it tended not to cover "inside jobs," where external
marks of entry would be less likely to exist. It also encouraged insureds to
properly lock all windows and doors. Based on these underwriting purposes,
the Atwater court concluded that the clause should not apply in the case before
it because the evidence strongly suggested that the specific insured's loss was
attributable neither to an inside job nor to insufficient care. Although intui-
tively attractive, this reasoning would not support the finding of an insurance
harm [as defined in the Schwarcz article]. The visible marks clause served a le-
gitimate underwriting purpose in Atwater because it reduced juridical hazard.
[Problems of fit between the exclusion and its purpose were] only clear to the
court after it examined all of the evidence at hand, and concluded that the bur-
glary was not an inside job and that Atwater [Creamery] had taken an adequate
amount of care. But such ex post factual investigation is costly, and, for that
reason, providing coverage that would require it may well be inefficient. 4
Although Schwarcz stops short of a firm finding that his proffered prod-
uct liability model of insurance would not find for the policyholder in cases
like Atwater (or C &J Fertilizer, which involved similar facts), he is close to
siding with insurers on this issue and repudiating the application of the rea-
sonable expectations approach to these types of cases, a perhaps unsurpris-
ing result in view of his negative assessment of the reasonable expectations
92. 366 N.W2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (en banc).
93. 227 N.W2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
94. See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1451-52 (foomotes omitted).
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concept. 9 Courts also appear to harbor similar difficulty with this issue and
with the reasonable expectations doctrine, as reflected in subsequent Min-
nesota and Iowa decisions that trimmed the reach of the doctrine.
96
The ineffectiveness of the narrower Schwarcz product liability model of
insurance or its support of noncoverage in these types of cases is a strong
brief in favor of the broader "insurance-policy-as-thing" perspective ad-
vanced in this article. Atwater and C&J Fertilizer were correctly decided
not only because the strong version of reasonable expectations advocated
by Keeton appears applicable, but also because a confluence of other in-
terpretative factors and the notion of an insurance policy as some-"thing"
purchased by policyholders strongly argues in favor of finding coverage.
Admittedly, the text of the burglary policies at issue is more favorable to
insurers. The policy form (which represents a part of the contract docu-
ments but is not necessarily an accurate representation of "the contract"
between the parties) states that a burglary must be one involving visible
marks of forced entry to be within coverage. But as emphasized by the
Atwater and C&JFertilizer courts, this language is imbedded within the
definitions section of the policy, where it is unlikely to be noticed by most
policyholders. Even sophisticated policyholders aware of this limitation on
coverage are most likely aware of it because of their experience and sophis-
tication, not because they actually read the policy form with care. 97
Allayed against the text are a number of contract interpretation factors
supporting the policyholder's argument for coverage. Clearly, the intent
of the policyholder in purchasing the policy was to enjoy coverage for any
non-fraudulent burglary that might befall it. The insurer can be said to have
intended its visible marks exclusion to achieve the same goal as well. On a
95. Id. at 1435-39.
96. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W2d 888 (1994)
(where exclusions are not hidden in the "Definitions" section of policy or otherwise obscured,
objectively reasonable policyholder expectations cannot trump clear policy language limiting
scope of coverage); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W2d 104 (Iowa 1981);
Rahdert, supra note 15. See also Cochran v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 271 N.W2d 331 (Neb. 1978)
(rejecting reasonable expectations perspective entirely and enforcing "visible marks of entry"
requirement against policyholder to preclude coverage for apparently legitimate burglary that
was not an inside job).
97. For that reason, the subsequent retreat from the reasonable expectations doctrine by
the Minnesota Supreme Court (Regents, 517 N.W2d at 888) and Iowa Supreme Court (Sand-
bulte, 302 N.W2d at 104) is not particularly persuasive. Although placing a limitation on
coverage in a segregated "exclusion" is less hidden than if the limitation is interwoven with
definitions or conditions, the fact remains that most policyholders will simply not read or
appreciate the exclusionary text. And, to cite a well-known axiom, it is the effect of the lan-
guage, not its placement, that determines whether it is an exclusion. If that is so, it should
be strictly construed against the insurer, who must bear the burden of persuasion to clearly
show that the limiting language is applicable. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 1, § 2.06[C].
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more substantive level, the insurer's intent was to avoid paying for losses
from inside jobs and from policyholder carelessness (e.g., not locking up
at night). This broader insurer intent can be satisfied by the Atwater/C&J
Fertilizer results so long as the loss was not in fact the product of an inside
job. However, as Schwarcz points out, determining this imposes some ju-
ridical costs on the insurer-but also imposes them on the policyholder as
well, making it less likely that the policyholder will seek coverage unless
the loss was legitimate. If nothing else, a policyholder making a burglary
claim surrounded by suspicious circumstances suggesting an inside job is at
risk for becoming the target of a criminal investigation by drawing greater
scrutiny to the suspicious loss and giving the insurer incentives to expose
possible policyholder involvement in fraud.
On a broader level, the purpose of a burglary policy is to transfer the risk
of burglary loss from the policyholder to the insurer and to spread the risk
throughout the pool of policyholders assembled by the insurer. The risk is
further spread by the insurer's purchase of reinsurance. This purpose would
seem adequately served as long as failure to satisfy the visible marks of entry
requirement does not become a loophole through which the insurer's risk
pool unravels. Admittedly, this may involve some greater transaction costs
in investigating, adjusting, and litigating claims than would an inflexibly
formal application of the visible marks text of the policy. But these addi-
tional costs are likely to be minor and can be spread through a modest
increase in premium.
Moreover, as noted above, if insurers aggressively challenge suspect
claims, unscrupulous policyholders are unlikely to bring many of them.
In addition to the risk of loss in the coverage action and its attendant cost,
the policyholder risks being exposed as a perpetrator of insurance fraud
that can lead to criminal prosecution and penalties. When one adds the
insurance policy as product perspective to the mix of traditional contract
interpretation considerations, the case for coverage in Atwater and C&J
Fertilizer situations moves from persuasive to nearly inarguable. The
burglary policy is not a simple contract and is certainly not one in which
the parties dickered over the definition of burglary, with any discussion
or shared understanding regarding the visible marks definition. Rather,
the burglary policy is a risk management product the policyholder buys to
provide contingent protection, should it be burglarized. A product of this
type is worth substantially less if it does not cover all real burglaries that
may befall the policyholder. In my view, the product is not even minimally
adequate if the visible marks requirement is strictly enforced as this would
result in too many cases in which there is no coverage for actual, non-
fraudulent, outside job burglaries.
A burglary policy limited to cases where tangible evidence of break-
age exists would be incomprehensive and incomplete. It would fail to
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achieve the risk management objective of the policyholder, would fail to
transfer and distribute all the risk intended, and would not facilitate pre-
diction of exposures so that the policyholder would be able to adequately
plan its business activities. In addition, unless all courts uniformly take a
literalist, pro-insurer stance regarding visible marks, there will continue
to be substantial juridical costs imposed on the policyholder, insurers, and
society due to more frequent litigation of the issue, as well as time lost
during informal claims adjustment and compromise that does not produce
reported litigation.
In short, it simply is easier and more efficient to treat the visible marks
requirement as something more like a "standard" or "guideline" rather
than a fixed command or rule mandating proof of visible injury to the
premises as a requirement for burglary coverage. The impact on insurance
cost is likely to be minimal and, in return, the burglary insurance product
becomes more valuable and dependable in serving its intended purpose.
Finding coverage in Atwater and C&J Fertilizer situations also prevents
the visible marks language from becoming an instrument of socially nega-
tive behavior. Strict enforcement of the language does not necessarily lead
to more care, less policyholder fraud, or more certainty. For example, an
unscrupulous policyholder can burglarize his or her own property and
still obtain coverage by simply breaking a window pane or snapping a lock
while leaving the premises with stolen merchandise. Although this bit of
larceny may raise the possibility of detection (e.g., a klutzy policyholder
could sustain an incriminating cut), the impact is likely to be trivial. Strict
application of the visible marks test, then, encourages a situation in which
really bad policyholders can nonetheless scam insurers while policyhold-
ers unfortunate enough to be victimized by slick burglars are left without
insurance.
Finding coverage in such situations-either by construing the visible
marks language as a guideline rather than a rule in light of the purpose of
the product or by mandating coverage to prevent the product from being
defective-is reminiscent of the argument legitimately and successfully
made in product liability tort cases where the manufacturer is found li-
able if it could have made the product safer and more effective through a
cheap or convenient modification of the product. In punch press cases, for
example, the manufacturer is often found liable where it failed to install
a hand guard or safety switch that prevents workers from placing their
fingers in danger while the machine is capable of working (and severing
digits because the worker extended an arm too far). Similarly, in swimming
pool product liability cases, the manufacturer has been found liable where
it could have prevented a child from being sucked into the pool drain with
the addition of a simple, cheap piece of plastic to reduce potentially deadly
suction.
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B. Pollution Exclusion
Another area in which consideration of the insurance policy as a product
designed to serve a purpose can illuminate coverage questions involves the
absolute or total pollution exclusion. Here again, the Schwarcz product
liability model of judicial regulation of insurance has potential applicabil-
ity. The exclusion bars coverage for claims "arising out of... discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of ... any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acid, alkalis, chemicals, and waste."98
The underwriting purposes of this clause are to limit the risks of adverse se-
lection and moral hazard inherent to gradual pollution that suddenly became
significant after the passage of [CERCLA]. But the clause's sheer breadth
means that insurers often invoke it to deny coverage, even when the nature
of the loss makes clear that doing so does not advance these underwriting
purposes. In one case, for example, an insured's employees accidentally spilled
ammonia from a blueprint machine in the course of moving equipment. In
another case, a construction worker applied a sealant to a warehouse floor
that immediately contaminated the food stored in the building. In each of
these instances, an insurer's reliance on the absolute pollution exclusion to
deny coverage would be considered an insurance harm because, from an ex
post perspective, it is self-evident from the nature of the loss that the clause's
purpose would not warrant the denial of coverage; both cases involve sudden
accidents that do not implicate the adverse selection or moral hazard prob-
lems of gradual pollution. Nor can the absolute pollution clause be justified
in these cases on grounds that it reduced juridical hazard: the very character
of the losses described above indicated that the core underwriting purposes of
reduced moral hazard and adverse selection did not apply.99
Professor Schwarcz's assessment is correct so far as it goes. However,
a broader application of insurance-as-product analysis makes the case for
coverage in such situations even clearer and provides guidance to courts
in cases involving carbon monoxide poisoning, lead paint poisoning, and
workplace incidents involving gasoline discharge or industrial fumes. In
cases of this type, courts have split regarding application of the pollution
exclusion, producing several outcomes that are distinctly unfair to policy-
holders by depriving them of coverage that logically falls squarely within
the product description of the CGL form.
The absolute pollution exclusion became part of the standard CGL pol-
icy in 1986, more than forty years after the dawn of the basic CGL form,
which was crafted as a more comprehensive and expanded general liability
98. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 14.1 1[C].
99. See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 1450-51 (footnotes omitted).
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policy extending beyond the Public Liability insurance and Owners, Land-
lords, and Tenants Liability insurance that was in widespread use prior to
the design of the CGL.' °
Viewed in historical context, it is quite clear that the CGL policy was
designed to provide broad coverage for the types of general liability claims
that were likely to confront commercial policyholders as a consequence of
their normal operations. Insurers were properly concerned that CGL cov-
erage should not apply merely because a policyholder was accused of sub-
standard work or where the policyholder intentionally caused injury. The
former concern was addressed through business risk exclusions, while the
latter concern was addressed through the expected or intended exclusion.
Although the original CGL form may have been premised on the no-
tion that an injury-causing event leading to litigation was isolated in time
and space, court decisions eventually gave a broad interpretation to the
word "accident" such that the CGL form applied to injuries and events
taking place over a more extended period of time. In 1966, the insurance
industry modified the CGL form to base it on damage caused by an "oc-
currence" rather than an "accident," with the specific intent that gradual
injury-causing conduct implicating the policyholder would be within cov-
erage. This, in turn, made the prospect of insurance coverage for pollution
activity more likely at a time when the United States was becoming more
environmentally conscious (e.g., Earth Day first appeared in 1970).
Concerned about pollution, insurers first considered complete exclu-
sion, but then moved to a qualified exclusion that made an exception where
the pollution-related claim involved "sudden and accidental" release of the
pollutant, with insurers taking the position that "sudden" meant "abrupt"
rather than merely being another way of saying "unintentional." In opposi-
tion, many policyholders argued that the word "sudden" was too unclear
to be construed against them and that any unintentional pollution was cov-
ered. When courts split on this interpretative issue, insurers were predict-
ably concerned, prompting use of the absolute pollution exclusion and its
inclusion in the 1986 standard CGL form.' 0'
As reflected in the Schwarcz analysis, this history makes clear that
abrupt and isolated discharges were not what the insurance industry had
in mind when it adopted the absolute pollution exclusion. In addition, the
background of the exclusion and the means by which it was introduced
to regulators makes clear that insurers wanted to avoid liability for the
type of widely dispersed, long-tail, hard to detect, and expensive-to-litigate
100. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 14.01(describing the advent
and history of CGL policy).
101. Id. §§ 14.11[B], 14.11[C].
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injuries associated with pollution and contamination claims.' °2 The cases
alluded to in the Schwarcz article (i.e., the spilled ammonia from the blue-
print machine and food adulteration because of careless treatment of con-
struction chemicals) are not within the intended scope of the pollution
exclusion not only because they took place abruptly, but also because they
were episodic events that were not part of a global pattern and, they did not
lead to the type of widely dispersed, decades-long injury associated with
historical pollution claims. As a result, these sorts of claims fall comfortably
within CGL coverage and outside the pollution exclusion under both the
Schwarcz approach and the insurance-as-thing interpretative perspective
outlined in this Part III of this article.
Considering the insurance policy as a product and the pollution exclu-
sion as a component of that product makes assessment of coverage disputes
easier and strengthens the already strong case (based on drafting history,
party intent, policy purpose, policyholder expectations, and avoidance of
absurd results) for coverage in such situations as a matter of contract analy-
sis. A CGL policy that fails to cover the ordinary business mishaps leading
to litigation is a woefully defective risk management product that should
not be sold, perhaps not even with the type of clear warnings required
under the Schwarcz product liability model of judicial regulation of insur-
ance policies. It is almost inevitable that a reasonably kinetic business will
have equipment break at the office and that this might occasionally have
consequences to a third party. It is also possible that a company using seal-
ant, paint, or other chemical products may make errors that result in dam-
age from fumes or chemicals in the particular vicinity of the error. These
sorts of typical business risks must be within the scope of the CGL form or
the policy is not a product fit for the policyholder that purchases it.
Similarly, if the policyholder is a furnace contractor that unwittingly al-
lows carbon monoxide fumes to injure a family, this is the type of injury that
falls within the concept of the CGL product, particularly as that product
was "launched" by the insurance industry during the mid-20th Century.03
Likewise, if a contractor fails to protect subcontractors from sealant fumes
or an exterminator applies chemicals incorrectly, claims stemming from
these events should be covered under any reasonable concept of the CGL
product. If a worker is harmed by spurting gasoline due to malfunction-
ing equipment or negligent maintenance, this is not the type of pollution
to be excluded from CGL coverage, notwithstanding that the plaintiff is
102. See Jeffrey W Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the "Absolute" Ex-
clusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1
(1998); Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 942 (1988).
103. See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, § 14.01.
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hurt in substantial part because of the irritating qualities of the gasoline
rather than from pressure or slipperiness alone. Rather, it is the type of
run-of-the-mill mishap that one knows can strike a business at any time. It
is the type of mishap that the CGL was designed to protect against. The
inclusion of the pollution exclusion in 1986 was not intended to change
the design of the CGL policy so much that it would eliminate this type of
basic coverage. If a policyholder's activities create smoke that obscures the
vision of nearby drivers, the resulting injuries and claims are not the result
of pollution, but of policyholder negligence of the type typically within the
scope of CGL coverage.
Events such as those described above are not only abrupt, but also rel-
atively confined in space, time, and impact. They do not involve long-
running or wide-ranging pollution that raises the prospect that the insurer
will be forced to pay for unduly coordinated risk. Rather, they involve
more or less typical (but sometimes tragic) workplace mishaps that only
incidentally involve chemicals. The policyholder could have accidentally
allowed the furnace to start a fire, failed to shut a pipe valve tightly, left
sharp tools within reach of small children, or broken a pipe on the way to
eradicating a cockroach. All of these types of events are classic instances
for CGL coverage. When the CGL form is viewed as a product as well as a
contract, it becomes clear that the mere presence of some limited chemical
"discharge" should not alter the coverage outcome. Further, these types
of cases involve none of the complex and expensive juridical and litigation
costs that may be presented by true pollution or toxic tort litigation.
Appreciating the nature of the CGL insurance as a product also rein-
forces the common sense notion that, when insurers used words like "dis-
charge" and "release" in the CGL form, they were not intending a highly
literal reading that would apply whenever any chemical of any type was
outside its confines of storage under any set of circumstances. For example,
the ammonia from the blueprint machine case discussed above was not dis-
charged or released except in the most literal sense. Rather, the ammonia
was spilled. Sealant fumes produced as a result of construction or painting
work are not discharged or released as much as they simply are a byproduct
resulting from the policyholder's ordinary commercial activity-the conse-
quences of which was to be insured under the CGL product.
A number of recent cases reflect quite well the implicit judicial view
that insurance policies are products designed to provide a particular type
of coverage. In such cases, efforts by a litigant to focus solely on isolated
text are ineffective if the court finds that the insurance policy's design and
intended purpose is to the contrary. Even where text-based arguments can
be rebutted by reference to other contrary text, a concept regarding the
nature of the policy at issue can provide additional solid ground for a deci-
sion on coverage.
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C. Poliy Periods and Available Limits
A sometimes vexing issue is the amount of insurance available for set time
periods when a policy is sold for less than a year or for a multiyear period.
Where a policy is sold for a one-year policy period and states policy limits,
the obvious conclusion is that the policy limits apply to any claims arising
out of an occurrence (or the total number of occurrences as respects an
aggregate limit) during that one year. But what about policies sold for a
three-year period? Does the policy limit apply to each year or to the three-
year period as a whole. And what about a policy period of less than one
year? Should the policy limit be prorated (e.g., a six-month policy has half
the limits stated on the declarations sheet)?
Courts have divided on this issue, particularly in the case of a multiyear
policy period. Although some cases realize that the policy limits must be
annualized to make sense of the insurance product, other cases have taken
a narrow textual view to read the policy limit as "clearly" being a three-year
policy limit. The latter view is incorrect. Fortunately, it has largely been
corrected by the language of the modern liability policy, which states
[t]he limits of this Coverage Part apply separately to each consecutive an-
nual period, and to any remaining period of less than 12 months, starting
with the beginning of the policy period shown in the Declarations, unless the
policy period is extended after issuance for an additional period of less than
12 months. In that case, the additional period will be deemed part of the last
preceding period for purposes of determining the Limits of Insurance. 104
104. See Insurance Services Office, CGL Policy Form CG 00 01 10 01 (2000). Section III,
reproduced in DONALD S. MALECKI & ARTHUR L. FLITNER, CGL: COMMERCIAL GENERAL Li-
ABILITY: COMMERCIAL LINES COVERAGE GUIDE 150 (8th ed. 2005). Commenting on this lan-
guage, Malecki and Flitner observe:
Although this section is largely self-explanatory, an example may be useful. Say that an
insured purchases a policy with a three-year policy period beginning July 1, 2004, and end-
ing July 1, 2007. The above provision makes it clear that even if the stated policy limits are
depleted by claims during the first year of the policy period, the full stated limits will again
be applicable beginning on July 1, 2005 (and again on July 1, 2006).
The provision also address situations when an annual policy period is shortened, as might
be the case if a policy with an inception date of July 1, 2004, was cancelled on January 1,
2005, instead of expiring on July 1, 2005. Despite the shortening of the last annual period,
the full stated limits would apply to claims covered under that period.
If, however, a policy is extended for a period of less than one year--say the insured re-
quests a one-month extension of the policy, after the regular policy term has expired-the
limits will not be renewed for that additional period. That is, if the policy limits had been
reduced by claims paid during the preceding annual policy period, the reduced amounts of
insurance would apply to the extension period, and not the full limits stated in the policy.
Id. at 150.
The "extended" policy situation could prove a trap for unwary policyholders in that exten-
sions for more than a brief time period hold the potential to leave the policyholder with lower
policy limits than intended. For example, if the policyholder extended coverage for eleven
months, a literal reading of the application of limits language would effectively cut the policy's
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Although this change is welcome, it could perhaps have been unneces-
sary if courts had consistently considered the insurance policy as a product
and not merely the sum of its verbiage. Taking this perspective requires
that policy limits be annualized not only because this is the objectively
reasonable expectation of most policyholders (in the absence of specific
discussion to the contrary), but also because the historical tradition of in-
surance and risk management is to structure an insurance program on an
annual basis. It is estimates of a company's exposure during a particular
year that drives the company's risk management and purchasing decisions.
Sales of insurance policies are typically for time periods of one year, unless
the policy is a replacement policy or uses a different length of time in order
to get back on a yearly basis of policy administration.
The three-year insurance policy was not sold as a product providing less
protection to the policyholder. Rather, the policy was sold as evidence of
greater protection that gave the policyholder a longer period of "guaran-
teed" insurance regardless of market changes and which obviated a com-
pany's need to shop for insurance each year. Conversely, insurers wanted
to sell the three year policy in order to lock customers into a longer period
of loyalty to the insurer, which also gave the insurer a guaranteed pre-
mium no matter what happened in the market and which obviated the
insurer's need to sell the policy every year, lowering the insurer's marketing
expenses. Although either insurer or policyholder may cancel, the inertia
of the situation makes it less likely that the policyholder will do so, even if
the market softens and cheaper liability insurance is available. Thus, when
viewing the liability insurance contract in historical perspective as a prod-
uct, it becomes apparent that three-year time periods are marketing and
administrative in nature-they are not efforts to reduce the limits of cover-
age by a third. Such a result would be completely at odds with the nature
of what was sold to policyholders.
The cases regarding the policy limits applicable to "stub" insurance poli-
cies of less than a year are more consistently and correctly decided in favor
of the policyholder. °5 In part this is because in these cases there usually
is no language similar to the three-year policy period juxtaposed with a
single dollar figure on the declarations sheet that an insurer may invoke
aggregate annual limit in half. In such circumstances, an insurance-as-product court may be
freed from strict application of the literal language in order to mandate the policy function as
intended. This would be particularly true if the insurer were charging commensurate premi-
ums as a condition of extending the policy.
105. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 969 E2d 329 (7th Cir.
1992) (applying Illinois law); Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co., 158 E Supp. 2d
906, 909-10 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11093 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (applying New York and Texas law). But see Lac
D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 864 E2d 1033, 1037, n.7 (3d Cir.
1988) (applying New York law); In re Midland Ins. Co., 709 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 2000).
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to argue for limited coverage nor do the cases involve the modem policy
language that makes a stub period of insurance (e.g., one month) subject to
the annualized policy limit to which it is attached. But, in addition, courts
in stub policy and related cases seem to have a better appreciation of the
manner in which an insurance policy with reduced policy limits for stub
periods would be a defective product unfit for the reasonable needs of a
commercial policyholder.
For example, in OneBeacon Insurance Co. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the
court held that the policyholder was entitled to the full policy limits of
$10 million per annum in a 1967-70 CGL policy for asbestos-related in-
jury taking place while the policy was in effect, even though the policy
was cancelled after only three months. 10 6 After purchasing the policy in
question (originally from Employers Surplus Lines Insurance Co., which
subsequently became OneBeacon) for the period from January 1, 1967, to
January 1, 1970, Georgia-Pacific "found its interests better served by a
new policy from the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania" and
canceled the OneBeacon policy, obtaining a refund of almost 90 percent of
the $10,000 premium. 10 7
Decades later, Georgia-Pacific presented OneBeacon ... with $10 million
of asbestos product-liability losses allegedly covered. ... OneBeacon main-
tained that its liability was capped at $2.5 million since the policy was in effect
for one-quarter of the year....
On language alone, looking at both the policy and the cancellation endorse-
ment, Georgia-Pacific has the better case. The policy, although in effect for
106. 474 E3d 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying Massachusetts law).
107. See id. at 6-7 ($8,700 of the $10,000 premium was refunded). Yes, liability insurance
really was that cheap during the good old 1960s. No wonder insurers felt burned when long-
tail liabilities like asbestos, pollution, or product liability became claims from 1970 to the
present. They had sold liability insurance cheap without taking into account the possibility of
mass tort liability that would later come home to roost at higher prices. But, in spite of that,
liability insurer profits appear to only have been modestly drawn down by the asbestos mass
tort claims, perhaps by as little as 3 percent.
Liability insurers held up financially in the face of asbestos because liability insurers, of
course, made money on many of their risks and, even as respects asbestos risks, have been
able to generate considerable investment income, while the long-tail asbestos tort took time
to develop. The slow pace of tort and coverage litigation further elongated the insurers' time
for payment, permitting them to continue to enjoy the time value of money, even if they, in
retrospect, undoubtedly wished they had charged higher premiums. In addition, some policy-
holders were unable to sustain claims because they neglected to keep old occurrence policies
on file and were unable to prove their insurance coverage, resulting in windfalls for those
insurers. When policy proceeds were finally paid, they were paid in dollars worth less than
the original premium dollars because of inflation. Thus, the rising cost of tort awards over
time is not as hurtful to insurers as is commonly supposed. See Jeffrey W Stempel, Assessing
the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CoNN.
INS. L.J. 349, 363-65, 464-76 (2006).
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only three months, explicitly provides $10 million in both per occurrence and
aggregate annual coverage. Further, the cancellation endorsement stated that
the only consequences of the cancellation were the shortened period of cover-
age and the refund of part of the premium: it said nothing about modifying
the aggregate limit of $10 million and substituting a $2.5 million figure.
[It is not] possible to read the phrase "for each annual period" as implying that
the aggregate limit should be mechanically prorated by the day, week, month
or quarter. Counsel for OneBeacon has conceded that the insurer would be
liable for $10 million-not $2.5 million-if a single catastrophic loss (say, a
single explosion) had occurred onJanuary 2, 1967. This is so even if the policy
were cancelled a week after the event. The concession was inevitable since no
one would want $10 million per occurrence coverage with an aggregate limit
one quarter that size.
[OneBeacon's argument that the policyholder receives a windfall if able to en-
joy the entire per annum limit] looks to the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties, which-absent extrinsic evidence of intent-means the help that context,
inferred purpose and common sense may give in determining what the parties
intended or would have been likely to intend if they had focused on the issue.
Courts, whatever tributes they may pay to plain language, tend to be interested
in such arguments, although the weight accorded turns on the circumstances.
Here, the circumstances are unhelpful to OneBeacon[,] ... [which argues that
the policyholder] sought $10 million in per-occurrence and aggregate cover-
age from Employers and a smaller aggregate [for a stub period, which makes
no sense.] The windfall argument therefore reduces to the question whether
[the insurer] would have charged [the policyholder] a higher monthly pre-
mium for such coverage had the policy been sought only for three months.
The decision as to how much of the premium to refund was within Employers'
control, presumably governed by policy language which Employers drafted or
adopted. In fact, the refund was not strictly pro rata; instead, the cancellation
penalty amounted to 5 percent of the total premium paid. If Employers con-
ferred any windfall on Georgia-Pacific by granting a refund on these terms, it
was a self-inflicted wound.
Policy language, surrounding circumstances and equitable concerns are likely
to vary a good deal from case to case. It is enough for us to say here that the
policy language favors Georgia-Pacific, that the most pertinent case law helps
its position and that OneBeacon has not shown that its [advocated] outcome-
reducing aggregate coverage from $ 10 million to $2.5 million-produces a
result that is either fairer or closer to reasonable expectations.08
108. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 474 E3d at 7-10 (citations omitted). One important citation
was to WILLISTON ON CONTACTS, § 49:20 (4th ed. 2006), for the proposition that "context,
inferred purpose, and common sense" are important factors in judicial construction of con-
tracts. Williston is generally considered more of a formalist and textualist contracts scholar
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The OneBeacon opinion is based on eclectic consideration of a number
of contract interpretation factors, but in its reading of the language and
assessment of party purpose and expectations, the opinion also appreciates
that the general liability policy is a risk management product purchased
by commercial actors. When the OneBeacon court is noting that it would
make no sense to have an aggregate limit subject to proration that reduced
the limit to amounts less than the annual per-occurrence limit, the court
is, in effect, viewing the policy as something purchased by the policyholder
that must be construed in a manner that gives the policyholder the thing
for which it paid. In OneBeacon, the product was $10 million of liability
protection for liability-producing events that caused damage during the
year. Permitting the insurer to reduce the value of the product just because
it was returned for a refund did not make sense and would have resulted in
the product becoming something less than what was sold. °9
D. Vacancy and Occupancy
The California Supreme Court's decision in TRB Investments, Inc. v. Fire-
man s Fund Insurance Co. 110 provides another good illustration of the value
of understanding the insurance policy's function as a protective product
rather than merely staring relentlessly at the text of a term in dispute. In
TRB Investments, the policyholder sought coverage under a property insur-
ance policy insuring a facility in Bakersfield that was rented to the Salva-
tion Army, which abandoned the location in late 2000, leaving the building
tenantless. The landlord policyholder retained an architectural firm and
general contractor
to transform the building into a "leasable shell," in which many of the interior
nonsupporting walls would be removed so that the space could be refashioned
to suit a particular tenant's needs. In April 2001, plaintiffs began negotiating
(as compared to functionalists Arthur Corbin and Allan Farnsworth, who resisted construc-
tion based on text standing alone), but even Williston was at least implicitly receptive to the
constellation of interpretative factors brought to bear when an insurance policy is assessed as
a product as well as a contract.
109. The OneBeacon case is more complicated than a typical or simple stub policy period
case in that it involves long-tail asbestos injury trigging multiple, consecutive policy periods.
For this reason, the insurer perhaps had a stronger case for proration of policy limits because
of precedent supporting such proration among strings of full-year policies. See STEMPEL ON
INSURANCE CONrnAcrS, supra note 1, § 14.13. See also One Beacon, 474 E3d at 8 ("[tlhe pres-
ent case differs from the hypothetical case of an explosion because the asbestos claims do not
comprise a single loss caused by a single event. The asbestos injuries likely are continuing
occurrences that straddle the effective periods of the Employers policy and the replacement
ICSOP policy, probably extending to periods before and after both policies.") (emphasis re-
moved). However, as the OneBeacon court also noted, "the problem of allocating a continuing
loss among the many insurers who were on the risk for the loss is not peculiar to short term
policies, nor is it an excuse for a court to alter express policy limits." See OneBeacon, 474 E3d
at 8.
110. 145 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2006).
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with Goodwill Industries for a long-term "build to suit" lease.... On or around
July 2, 2001, Goodwill entered into a lease agreement for the property.I'
During June and July 2001, the building saw considerable construction
activity, including electrical contracting and heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning work. On Monday, July 16, workers discovered water dam-
age from a burst heater or waterline that had taken place sometime the
preceding weekend (July 14-15 or during the early hours of the 16th).
Work on the building continued, with the landlord policyholder spending
more than $1.2 million on improvements and Goodwill eventually taking
occupancy as tenant."
12
The policyholder submitted a property loss claim for the July 16 water
damage, which the insurer denied, citing the vacancy exclusion in the pol-
icy, which read:
If loss or damage occurs to a building that has been vacant for more than 60
consecutive days prior to the occurrence of that loss or damage, we will:
a. not pay for any loss or damage caused by:
1. Vandalism;
2. Sprinkler leakage, unless you have protected the system against freez-
ing;
3. Building glass breakage;
4. Water damage;
5. Theft, or
6. Attempted theft
A building is vacant when it does not contain enough business personal prop-
erty to conduct customary operations.
Buildings under construction are not considered vacant.'
In addition, a cancellation provision of the policy stated that the insurer
could cancel the policy if the building was vacant or "unoccupied 60 or
more days," but that the provision did not apply to buildings that were "in
the course of construction, renovation, or addition."' 4
Not surprisingly, the policyholder argued that the vacancy exclusion did
not apply because the building was "under construction" at the time of the
water damage. But both the trial court and the intermediate state appellate
court sided with the insurer, holding that the term "under construction"
was restricted to only the building of a new structure and that the build-
ing was "vacant" at the time of the water loss. The California Supreme
111. Id. at 475.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 474.
114. Id.
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Court unanimously reversed, remanding for further proceedings." 5 The
California Supreme Court's TRB Investments opinion is soundly reasoned
not only as a matter of textual interpretation and appreciation of the intent,
purpose, and expectations of the parties, but also because it appreciated the
role of property insurance as a product sold to property owners in order to
fulfill a particular function.'
16
To be sure, the court engaged in what might be termed the standard
mainstream analysis of examining the policy wording, assigning burdens of
persuasion and being alert to ambiguity and its resolution. In particular, the
TRB Investments court attempted to give a "common sense" construction to
the word "construction," including reference to statutory use of the term
as well as everyday use of the word. Of particular importance to the court
was reading the policy as a whole and attempting to reconcile the vacancy-
exclusion-construction exception with the cancellation provisions of the
policy, which treated renovation as a subset of construction-and conse-
quently undermined the lower court view that "construction" must mean
"new" construction or erecting a building rather than remodeling it."7 Cer-
tainly, one could characterize TRB Investments as simply a broad-based con-
tract interpretation opinion. However, the court's focus on the structure and
function of the vacancy exclusion to a property policy brings it within the
realm of insurance-as-product analysis as well.
[B]oth the vacancy exclusion and the cancellation endorsement serve to pro-
tect the insurer against the increased risks of loss that occur when premises
are unoccupied for an extended period of time. Likewise, the construction ex-
ception to the vacancy exclusion serves the same function as the construction
exception in the cancellation endorsement. If a building is regularly occu-
pied during normal business hours, as is usually contemplated for commercial
structures, then an insurer can assess risk based upon such occupancy. When
there is substantial construction activity on the premises, the risk of loss be-
comes roughly equivalent to that of an occupied building, thus giving the
insurer the benefit of its prior risk assessment.
The Court of Appeal's focus on whether the term "under construction" en-
compasses only the erection of new structures or also includes renovations
115. Id. at 473-74, 480.
116. The TRB Investments opinion is consistent with decisions of other courts regarding
the scope of the "under construction" exception to the vacancy exclusion. See, e.g., Warren
Davis Prop. V, LLC v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 111 S.W3d 515, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003);
Brouillette v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 340 So. 2d 667, 670-71 (La. Ct. App. 1976). However,
there are prominent cases siding with the trial and appellate court opinion in TRB Investments
that "construction" does not include repairs or renovations on existing buildings. See, e.g.,
Myers v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 788 E2d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Illinois
law); Jerry v. Ky. Cent. Ins. Co., 836 S.W2d 812, 814-16 (Tex. App. 1992); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Wilkes County, 116 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960).
117. See TRBInvs., 45 P.3d at 477-78.
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thus fails to take into account the rationales underlying the vacancy exclusion
and the construction exception. We believe the proper inquiry for determin-
ing whether a building is "under construction" for purposes of defining an
exception to the vacancy exclusion is whether the building project, however
characterized, results in "substantial continuing activities" by persons associ-
ated with the project at the premises during the relevant time period. Under
that test, "sporadic entry" would be insufficient to find a substantial continu-
ing presence of workers required for a finding of "construction." We believe
this test better serves the purposes underlying the vacancy exclusion and more
accurately reflects the reasonable expectations of an insured than any test
turning upon technical distinctions between "construction" on [the] one hand
and "renovation" or "remodeling" on the other.118
The court gave some solace to the insurer by remanding the case for
further proceedings rather than entering judgment for the policyholder.
Although the basic facts were undisputed and they tended to show that the
building was getting the same sort of scrutiny on Mondays through Fridays
that an occupied building would receive, the court took the view that, in
this case of first impression, the parties had not been given an opportunity
to "elicit key facts which might have a bearing on the relevant inquiry, i.e.,
whether the construction project here was such that there were substantial
continuing activities on the premises during the relevant period."'1 19
In TRB Investments, the California Supreme Court identified the issue as
one of first impression in the nation's largest state and also regarded exist-
ing precedent as not having "engaged in the sort of thorough examination
of the policy language" performed by the California courts in the instant
118. Id. at 478-79 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 479. Continued the court:
The record reflects that electrical and HVAC subcontractors engaged in various activities
at the building, and that various other personnel, such as the contractor and the architect,
also spent time there in the weeks prior to the loss at issue. But, the record does not disclose
the number of people associated with the construction project, how many hours per day
or days per week they were in the building, and how much of the building was occupied
by these persons at any given time. Those and similar facts would be needed to determine
whether there was a substantial continuing presence of construction personnel.
Id.
With this directive for inquiry on remand, the court is perhaps being excessively generous
to the insurer. If sustained occupancy is the risk-reducing, premium-calculating objective
underlying the vacancy exclusion and its construction exception, it is of course important that
construction activity not be unduly rare. But the nature of construction often has a "hurry-
up-and-wait" quality. A job site may be nearly empty one day and buzzing with activity the
next, depending on the availability of materials and subcontractors. But the property is "under
construction" even on the slow days of a renovation project. A policyholder should not be
required to prove the constant presence of workers on site to satisfy the under construction
exception to the vacancy exclusion. If the insurer wanted a twenty-four-hour security guard,
it could have insisted on this as a condition of coverage.
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case.' 21 Certainly, the TRB Investments courts made a thorough examina-
tion of the language at issue. But, more important perhaps, the court did
not rely on linguistic analysis alone in reaching its sensible conclusion that
the water damage was covered if the property was at no greater risk while
being renovated than would be the case if it had been fully occupied as an
office building.1 21 The court appreciated the design, function, and purpose
of the property insurance product, which informed the court's interpreta-
tion of the words "under construction." The TRB Investments ruling sought
to have property insurance function as the product was intended, in a man-
ner protecting the legitimate interests of the product's manufacturer (the
insurer) and its user (the policyholder).
E. Scope of EPL Coverage and Labor Law Violations
Another example where insurance-as-product thinking helped to clarify a
coverage decision is Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n v. St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Co.12 2 In Farmers v. St. Paul, an employer (Farmers, in its capacity
as a policyholder rather than an insurer) sought coverage under an EPL
(Employment Practices Liability) policy issued by St. Paul when Farmers
faced a class action suit by claims adjusters seeking overtime pay pursu-
ant to the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. The trial court and a unanimous
Seventh Circuit agreed with St. Paul's denial of coverage based on what
might be termed the "labor law" exclusion of the policy, which exempted
from coverage
Furthermore, the occasional on-again, off-again quality of construction is not significantly
different for risk management purposes than what takes place in a fully occupied building. Re-
call that the water damage in TRB Investments took place on a weekend, a time during which
the problem was unlikely to be detected. Unless a worker in the affected area happened to be
logging some weekend overtime, the water was just as likely to be undetected until Monday,
as would be the case for construction (and was the case in TRB Investments).
If the construction crew working on the Bakersfield building in TRB Investments was not on
site until Wednesday, the water damage would most likely have been worse, but this type of
delay in discovery could occur in an office building as well if the workers closest to the prob-
lem were on outside assignment, or if the tenant company was holding a retreat or planning
session offsite. None of these situations presents the type of heightened risk of destruction
to property that takes place when a structure is completely devoid of human activity for the
thirty- or sixty-day periods that property insurance policies usually use to define vacancy.
Similarly, the vacancy exclusion of a homeowner's policy is not triggered by a family's ab-
sences for vacation or business travel. But in such cases, the home may be without human
occupancy for far longer than the time at issue in TRB Investments.
120. Id. at 476.
12 1. The fully operational office building probably would have been empty on the week-
end that the pipe in question burst. Further, presence of a night watchman or security guard
would have been unlikely to ensure prompt detection of the pipe incident. Security details
can be pretty effective at keeping intruders out or noticing when they breach a building, but
night watchmen are not expected to scour the premises in search of water damage from leak-
ing pipes.
122. 482 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Illinois law).
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any actual or alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (except the
Equal Pay Act), the National Labor Relations Act, the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1983, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, any workers' compensa-
tion, unemployment insurance, social security, or disability benefits law, other
similar provisions of any federal state or local statutory or common law or any
rules or regulations promulgated under any of the foregoing. 2 3
The Seventh Circuit found that, because the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law was "the state's counterpart to the Fair Labor Standards Act," it fell
comfortably within the "other similar provisions of any state law" por-
tion of the various labor law causes of action excluded from the scope of
St. Paul's EPL coverage. 2 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court was un-
moved by the policyholder's attempt to invoke the contra proferentem
principle (ambiguities are construed against the drafter of the contract) be-
cause the meaning of the words "other similar provisions" of state law were
sufficiently clear in the context of the type of insurance policy at issue.'25
The court did not base its decision on the almost delicious irony of a
major insurer pleading for application of the ambiguity approach,'26 but
instead viewed the EPL policy as a type of product in which the intended
audience of the product, i.e., employers, would be well aware of the na-
ture of the limitations on coverage imposed in the labor law exclusion.The
court emphasized that construction of policy terms must be made with an
appreciation of the intended audience and also suggested that the meaning
of policy terms must accord with the nature of the insurance policy.
Farmers cites us to Illinois cases which say that words left undefined in an
insurance policy should be interpreted with reference to the average person's
understanding. But that is a blind guide in the present case because the aver-
age person has no understanding of the exclusion of claims based on the Fair
Labor Standards Act and similar statutes. The language is not addressed to
the average person, but to employers, and they know what the Fair Labor
Standards Act is, know there are state counterparts, and could not think they'd
123. Id. at 977 (emphasis removed).
124. Id. at 977-79.
125. Id.
126. The Farmers v. St. Paul court observed that it did not
buy Farmers' contention that the word "similar" is so hopelessly vague that it cannot be
given any effect in an insurance-policy exclusion. The contention is astonishing because
of its implications for Farmers' use of the word in exclusions in its own policies, and in
any event unsound because of its neglect of context. Standing alone, the word "similar"
partakes of the vagueness of other verbal signifiers of matters of degree, such as "substan-
tial," "significant," and "probable." But context can give it a precise meaning, as this case
illustrates.
Id. at 978 (citation omitted) (emphasis removed).
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bought insurance that would enable them to disregard the state overtime pro-
visions. The interpretation of a document is relative to the understanding of
the intended readership, not to the average Joe. It is no more relevant that
he would not understand the exclusion of claims based on the Fair Labor
Standards Act and similar statutes than that someone ignorant of the English
language wouldn't understand it either.27
The court appreciated that the EPL policy is designed primarily to pro-
tect employers when sued under the antidiscrimination laws. Its focus is
race, gender, and age discrimination litigation, including sexual harassment
cases. These types of risks are potentially difficult, but relatively cabined,
and in turn demand a corresponding premium relative to the risk. Wage
and hour claims such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and its cousins or
other types of employee benefits claims present quite different risks that
would command a correspondingly higher premium. In addition, as quoted
above, the court would not accept as credible the idea that an employer
could expect to purchase a policy that would subsidize the employer's vio-
lations of overtime payment law.
In addition, the types of wage and hour, employee benefits claims ex-
cluded in the St. Paul EPL policy can be said to be the type of claims that
either have an uncomfortable element of volition or present risks more
clearly within the arguable control of the policyholder. Employers should
be able to comply with the law regarding wages and compensation. These
are more akin to the contract-like risks that are often outside the scope
of liability policies. By contrast, the risk of race or gender discrimina-
tion, particularly sexual harassment, is less subject to policyholder control.
A lecherous foreman or a racist office manager can create an EPL claim in
spite of upper management's best efforts to avoid such exposures. By con-
trast, employee compensation and working hours are more readily subject
to central supervision, control, and risk management.
By taking a broader contextual view sensitive to the nature of the EPL
insurance product and the differing nature of wage and hour claims as
compared to discrimination claims, the court rendered a decision that is
consistent with the insurance-as-product approach as well as to intent and
purpose based contract construction. By bringing the Illinois state wage
claim within the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act exclusion, the
Farmers v. St. Paul court was simply making the EPL policy function as the
type of product it was intended to be.
E CGL Policies and Spoliation of Evidence Claims
In another case reflecting insurance-as-product thinking, the policyholder
attempted to argue that its CGL policy provided coverage for a spoliation
127. Id. at 979 (citations omitted).
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of evidence claim made by a third party. Brian Wright died when the Ford
Bronco he was driving rolled over. Policyholder O'Hare Auto Recycling
acquired the Bronco from a towing company that removed it from the
scene of the accident. Counsel for Wright's estate paid O'Hare to store the
vehicle until it could be analyzed for purposes of a possible product liability
claim by Wright's estate against Ford or others. O'Hare mistakenly crushed
the Bronco, substantially reducing or eliminating its evidentiary value for
the Wright wrongful death/products liability claim. Wright's estate in turn
sued O'Hare for spoliation, arguing that O'Hare's negligence had dramati-
cally reduced or eliminated a potential claim arising out of Wright's death
(and, apparently, that the uncrushed vehicle itself had some value that was
eliminated when the car was crushed; presumably, the estate also wanted
its money back).'28
Both the trial court and the Illinois Court of Appeals found no cover-
age. The appellate court based its decision, in part, on the language of the
policy, which contained a common exclusion for claims of property dam-
age to "personal property in the care, custody or control of the insured"
(often referred to as the CCC exclusion).' 29 But the court's rejection of the
claim was not based solely on the text of the exclusion. Rather, the court
discussed, in some detail, the background and purpose of the exclusion,
which is part of CGL policy design intended to avoid coverage for damage
caused by faulty workmanship. "The 'care, custody or control' exclusion
'prevent[s] the general liability insurer from becoming a guarantor of the
insured's workmanship in his ordinary operations. Failures of workmanship
are a normal business risk which the insured is in the best position to pre-
vent.' "130 Had it wanted to adopt a more pro-policyholder orientation, the
Wright court could have differentiated damage to property being "worked
on" by a policyholder (e.g., a watch left for repair or pants ruined by poor
dry cleaning) and the type of loss at issue in Wright: the policyholder's neg-
ligent destruction of property that it was supposed to preserve. A highly
pro-policyholder court might have even cited a case like Vandenberg' to
argue that the grant of damage claims of physical injury to property was
not sufficiently rebutted by the CCC exclusion, since O'Hare was not
really "working on" the Bronco in question. However, the Wright court
wisely rejected this course of construction, not only because of the literal
clarity of the CCC exclusion, but also because of other factors tending to
confirm that the CGL policy simply was not designed to provide coverage
128. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Wright, 862 N.E.2d 1194, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1196-97 (quoting Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 527 E2d
1025, 1030 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying Illinois law)).
131. Vandenberg v. Superior Ct., 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999).
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for spoliation claims or similar claims that policyholder conduct caused a
third party to have a less viable lawsuit against a separate defendant.
For example, the Wright court noted that the uncontested facts of the
case established "at least a constructive bailment" of the Bronco and that
negligent bailment claims are in essence business risk claims that were
not designed to be covered by the CGL policy.132 The appellate court
implicitly concurred with the trial court's observation that the estate's
claim was one alleging breach of a contractual duty, which is normally
outside the tort-based orientation of general liability policies.133 As noted
above and emphasized in the California Supreme Court's Vandenberg de-
cision, the shorthand rule that general liability insurance exists to cover
tort claims against the policyholder rather than contract claims against
the policyholder is not so literally true that it overrides policy language
when a breach of contract claim involves property damage perpetrated by
the policyholder. However, in Wright, it was clear that a contract-based,
bailment-based, custody-based claim was in fact a claim that the policy-
holder had delivered poor services to its customer. It was not a claim that
the policyholder's negligence had reached out to harm the customer in
ways beyond the contractual relationship.
In addition, the Wright court found that a claim of damage to the estate's
potential lawsuit was too intangible to constitute property damage within
the meaning of a CGL policy.134 Implicitly, the Wright court also found
that a spoliation claims was simply too remote from the type of bodily
injury/property damage claims that the CGL policy was intended to cover.
The Wright holding can be supported as a matter of textual analysis alone.
But, when coupled with a structural analysis of the CGL and the situation
in light of the purpose, intent, and function of the CGL product, the cor-
rectness of the Wright holding becomes dramatically clearer and eliminates
the prospect that the policyholder could win undeserved coverage from ap-
plication of the ambiguity approach or a reasonable expectations analysis.
Even small business policyholders cannot have an objectively reasonable
expectation of coverage for their business errors since these losses lie out-
side the contemplation of the CGL policy as a product.
132. See Wright, 862 N.E.2d at 1197-98.
133. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting trial transcript on grant of summary judgment to insurer). See
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 1, §§ 14.13, 25.05, regarding business risk
exclusions to liability insurance coverage.
134. See Wright, 862 N.E.2d at 1196-97 ("a cause of action does not qualify as tangible
property. Thus, O'Hare's policy does not cover the diminution in the value of appellant's
products liability claim."), citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hennings, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74640 (C.D. 111. Oct. 13, 2006) (CGL policy does not cover claim that policyholder conduct
caused plaintiff to suffer diminution in value of workers compensation claim).
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G. Anti-Stacking Provisions
Another example where viewing the insurance policy as a product may
have been helpful is Roberts v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,13 in
which the court held that anti-stacking provisions of automobile insurance
policies and a motorcycle policy did not apply where the policies were is-
sued by separate insurers. Stacking occurs when a policyholder with several
policies is permitted to aggregate the limits of each policy into one larger
limit in order to obtain more coverage than the face value of a vehicle's
policy when the vehicle is the subject of a claim.
Stacking litigation was a major source of coverage litigation during the
1970s and 1980s, with results varying among the jurisdictions, prompt-
ing insurers to add specific anti-stacking language to their policies. Anti-
stacking language is found in auto insurance policies in order to prevent
a series of auto policies held by the same family or business from turning
into one "mega-policy," providing huge policy limits disproportionate to
the premiums paid. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this is a case
in which a trucking company with low uninsured motorist policy limits
of $25,000 per truck was able to multiply this amount by its entire fleet
of trucks in order to have nearly $1.7 million of coverage when one of its
trucks was involved in a serious collision.1 36
Insurers dislike stacking so much because it changes the nature of the
risk insured. For example, if I purchase a $25,000 liability policy for my
Ford Expedition (an environmentally incorrect vehicle capable of inflict-
ing substantial damage to others), I am assessed a commensurate premium
based in part on the vehicle, as well as my driving records. (I would also
135. 144 P.3d 546 (Colo. 2006).
136. See Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 387 N.W2d 642 (Minn. 1986). The
decision was largely driven by perceived ambiguities in the policy form, which was of course
drafted by the insurer seeking to limit its exposure to $25,000 because only one insured ve-
hicle was involved in the accident. "It seems unlikely that the employer expected that it had
purchased and paid for over a million dollars worth of uninsured motorist coverage for each
of its employees. Should this fact have affected the result in the case?" See KENNETH S. ABRA-
HAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 41 (4th ed. 2005).
My answer to Abraham's perhaps rhetorical question is that it is legitimate for courts to
consider actual expectations of the parties, even when this works against the policyholder.
Consideration of actual and general understanding of a policy should be a two-way street for
insurers and policyholders alike. But, where the policyholder legitimately holds an under-
standing not shared by the insurer, the policyholder's expectations should take precedence as
between these two perspectives. But, under an insurance-as-product approach and an eclectic
application of traditional contract construction norms, the policyholder's expectations may
not always be determinative (although, if objectively reasonable, they are likely to be con-
sistent with the intended function of the insurance policy "product"). Consumers may have
misplaced expectations and a product may simply not be designed or intended to cover a
particular situation or deliver a specific function-no matter how much one of the parties
expected coverage.
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be nuts to have so little coverage). Similarly, if the family also purchases a
$25,000 policy on my wife's much more sensible Honda Accord, the same
pricing and risk distribution considerations apply. In effect, the insurer is
making an estimate about the odds that either the Expedition or the Ac-
cord will be in an accident resulting in litigation and is willing to provide
up to $25,000 of coverage in return for a certain premium.
If the Expedition is in an accident and the two policies are stacked,
there suddenly is $50,000 worth of coverage, but no corresponding
recalibration of the premium. At the margin, this hurts the insurer fi-
nancially by raising its exposure for an Expedition-related crash but not
extracting from me a correspondingly higher premium. If we plug in
larger amounts (e.g., individual auto policy limits of $500,000) or if my
Clampett-like family were to have a score of low-limit policies on the
fleet of autos parked in our yard, the potential loss to the insurer be-
comes clearer. Consequently, anti-stacking clauses make sense from the
insurer's perspective.
They also make sense from the policyholder's perspective. As even a
half-prudent consumer, I should not expect to be protected by aggregating
policy limits of the family vehicles. Rather, I should pay a correspondingly
higher premium and buy the per vehicle coverage I need to protect me
from becoming an auto accident defendant. Where the insurance involved
is not a batch of auto policies from the same insurer, but instead involves
different products (motorcycle and automobile) from different insurers,
the case for applying anti-stacking language arguably weakens, a factor that
can be used to defend the Roberts result. But Roberts, despite the court's
unanimity, appears wrongly decided.
The Roberts court based its decision on its finding that the anti-stacking
language in question was a limitation on coverage that was insufficiently
conspicuous and therefore not enforceable.'37 The opinion can be charac-
terized as one based on reasonable expectations or fairness, founded on a
theory that issuance of an auto policy suggests coverage, that limitations
of coverage operate as exclusions and that like any exclusion, the insurer
bears the burden of persuasion as to its applicability, a burden that logically
includes showing that the limitation was not "snuck" into the policy in a
nonvisible manner.
The problem with such a defense of Roberts, however, is that, as discussed
above, prevention of stacking makes sense. As policyholders of six-count
'em, six-auto policies and a motorcycle policy, the Roberts family cannot
seriously have viewed the cumulative policy limits as the per vehicle policy
limits. Rather, the typical policyholder would ask the agent and read the
137. See Roberts, 144 P.3d at 551.
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declarations page to determine the policy limits for each vehicle. Regard-
less of whether the anti-stacking language was conspicuous, a reasonable
policyholder would look to the individual declarations sheet in order to
determine the limits of coverage.
My criticism of the Roberts result is, of course, based in part on a differ-
ent view of objectively reasonable expectations than that apparently held
by the Colorado Supreme Court. But, in addition, an assessment of auto
insurance policies as products supports my disagreement with the Roberts
result. As discussed above, the risk calculation for issuing an auto policy in-
volves determining the odds that a particular vehicle will be in an accident.
Even a family of bad drivers is unlikely to have all the family cars crash
simultaneously. The insurer in turn determines the premium to be charged
per vehicle in relation to the policy limits per vehicle. That is the nature
of the pricing for the particular insurance product at issue. Under these
circumstances, the insurance as product approach illuminates the arguable
error of the Roberts holding.
IV. CONCLUSION
Appreciating the product-like characteristics of insurance policies will im-
prove analysis of insurance coverage disputes. Although the notion of an
insurance policy as part chattel and part contract has been a brooding omni-
presence for decades, courts have largely failed to date to enlist the concept in
the concrete resolution of cases. Sound application of the insurance-policy-
as-thing concept does not require complex economic analysis but merely ad-
equate appreciation of the role played by various insurance products.
As the above discussion reflects, appreciating the product-like charac-
teristics of the insurance contract does not inevitably lead to victory for
either insurers or policyholders in coverage battles. Rather, consideration
of the insurance policy's intended use and implicit warranty can favor ei-
ther side, depending on the nature of the coverage claim in relation to
the policy's function. Sometimes, appreciation of the insurance policy as
a thing designed to achieve a particular objective can even save insurers
from drafting errors that could otherwise require the imposition of the
contra proferentem principle.
Regardless of whether the notion of insurance policies as things provides
proportionately greater assistance to insurers or policyholders, it holds the
promise of illuminating policy meaning and avoiding the occasional arbitrary
results that can result from excessive fixation on policy text in isolation.
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